Getting More by Asking Less: Justifying and Reforming Tax Law\u27s Offer-in-Compromise Procedure by Oei, Shu-Yi




GETTING MORE BY ASKING LESS:  JUSTIFYING AND  
REFORMING TAX LAW’S OFFER-IN- 
COMPROMISE PROCEDURE 
SHU-YI OEI † 
The Offer in Compromise (OIC) is a procedure by which the IRS may agree to 
forgive a portion of the tax liabilities of certain taxpayers.  This Article suggests 
a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of any proposed reforms to this pro-
cedure.  It presents three arguments that support forgiving tax debts through 
devices such as the OIC.  These arguments are rooted in revenue-raising, fair-
ness, rehabilitative, and socioeconomic considerations.  Unfortunately, an analysis 
of the OIC’s recent history shows that its current structure tends to undermine 
its effectiveness.  The power to effectuate the procedure is dispersed among four 
stakeholders with divergent interests:  Congress, the IRS, the taxpayer, and finan-
cial and other supporters of the taxpayer.  Each of these players has conflicting 
and contradictory interests in OIC-procedure outcomes.  Over time, the actions 
and decisions of each of these players can lead to conflicting and counterproduc-
tive behaviors and responses by other players, and this undermines the program’s 
overall effectiveness.  Given this dynamic among stakeholders, reforms that 
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would minimize or eliminate such downward-spiraling interactions of divergent 
interests should be adopted.  Conversely, reforms likely to provoke or exacerbate 
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INTRODUCTION 
What should happen when a taxpayer cannot pay her taxes?  
Should the taxpayer, who may be experiencing financial hardship or 
facing exceptional personal circumstances, always be compelled to pay 
the full amount of her tax liability, no matter the consequences?  And 
what measures can or should the taxing authority take against a tax-
payer who cannot pay?  Under what circumstances should tax debts be 
forgiven in order to further greater societal and revenue goals?  The 
answers to these and other questions are of vital importance in analyz-
ing the law of tax collections.  With a few notable exceptions,1 however, 
 
1 See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 
84 IND. L.J. 57, 88-111 (2009) [hereinafter Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process] (criticiz-
ing the 1998 “Collection Due Process” reforms that were designed to improve adminis-
trative and judicial review of IRS tax collection decisions); Bryan T. Camp, Tax 
Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring 
and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 82 (2004) [hereinafter Camp, Tax Administra-
tion as Inquisitorial Process] (distinguishing the procedural rights provided in the crimi-
nal justice system from those available in civil tax collection disputes); Danshera Cords, 
Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429, 
474 (2008) (arguing for more consistent application of administrative law procedures 
between tax collection cases in the Tax Court and those in the district courts); Steve R. 
Johnson, An IRS Duty of Consistency:  The Failure of Common Law Making and a Proposed 
Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. REV. 563, 578 & n.86 (2010) (questioning whether the 
Administrative Procedure Act creates a duty for the IRS to treat similarly situated tax-
payers consistently in tax collection cases); Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the 
Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 992-96 (2003) (concluding that improved customer 
service by the taxing authorities does not increase tax collections and compliance).   
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the academic literature tends to treat these collections issues as an  
afterthought, secondary in importance to more substantive or theoret-
ical issues such as the tax base, tax rates, tax expenditures, and even 
tax penalties.  These tax collections issues therefore tend to be under-
studied and underanalyzed.2  Yet these issues have great policy signifi-
cance because the ways in which we collect taxes that have been assessed 
and are owed implicate important tax policy concerns, including effi-
ciency, equity, administrability, and distributive justice. 
In this Article, I analyze one of the tools in the IRS’s collections 
toolkit—its power to compromise a tax liability via the Offer-in-
Compromise (OIC) procedure3—and propose an analytical framework 
through which the procedure should be understood and ultimately 
reformed.  Generally speaking, the OIC procedure is a collections 
procedure by which the IRS may forgive a portion of the debts owed 
by certain taxpayers who are having difficulty paying the full amount 
owed.  Such a taxpayer may offer to settle her tax liability by paying 
only a portion of the total taxes due.  The taxpayer must meet certain 
requirements and conditions in order to qualify, and the IRS has the 
discretion to accept or deny the offer.  The OIC procedure is there-
fore an important way in which the tax system copes with the problem 
of taxpayers who are unable to pay their taxes.  However, there is al-
most no academic literature on the subject.4 
My study of the OIC procedure has both programmatic and philo-
sophical goals:  I examine the procedure in the interest of program-
 
2 There is literature on the question of whether some degree of evasion should be 
permitted.  However, this literature does not generally address directly the question of 
how to respond to inability to pay or taxpayer distress.  See, e.g., James Andreoni, IRS as 
Loan Shark:  Tax Compliance with Borrowing Constraints, 49 J. PUB. ECON. 35, 44 (1992) 
(arguing that full tax compliance may not be desirable because the IRS can smooth 
consumption of borrowing-constrained taxpayers by permitting some amount of eva-
sion, thereby “partially completing capital markets”); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation 
with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J. PUB. ECON. 221 (1990) (analyzing the distor-
tionary impacts of raising tax rates versus increasing enforcement activity in determin-
ing optimal enforcement policy).    
3 This Article refers to the Offer-in-Compromise procedure as the “OIC procedure” 
or simply as “OIC.” 
4 As discussed in this Article, the National Taxpayer Advocate, the Government  
Accountability Office, and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration have 
studied and written about the procedure.  However, there is little academic scholarship 
about the procedure.  A notable exception is a 1994 law review article on the question 
of whether a compromise of a tax liability is taxable income.  See Richard C.E. Beck, Is 
Compromise of a Tax Liability Itself Taxable?  A Problem of Circularity in the Logic of Taxation, 
14 VA. TAX REV. 153 (1994). 
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specific reform and also as a gateway to the consideration of broader 
issues of when, why, and to what extent a tax liability should be forgiven.  
I argue that important revenue-raising, fairness-based, rehabilitative, 
and socioeconomic arguments weigh in favor of having a systematic 
and effective “escape valve” for tax-debt forgiveness.  Most pertinently, 
IRS collections data show that the IRS ultimately collects more per dol-
lar of outstanding tax liability through accepted offers in compromise 
than it does from offers it has rejected.5  OICs also yield more cents on 
the dollar than do regular collections methods with respect to certain 
categories of delinquent tax debts.6  But despite these encouraging 
numbers, an analysis of the procedure’s recent history reveals prob-
lematic trends that suggest that it is not operating as effectively as it 
could be.   
I argue that the OIC procedure is structured in a way that system-
atically undermines its effectiveness.  Problematically, the power to 
effectuate the OIC procedure is dispersed among four stakeholders 
with divergent interests:  (1) Congress, (2) the IRS, (3) the taxpayer, 
and (4) financial and other supporters of the taxpayer.  Each of these 
players has conflicting and contradictory interests in how tax for-
giveness should operate in general, and in how the OIC procedure 
should function in particular.  Moreover, the actions and decisions of 
each of the players may provoke counterproductive responses from 
other players, such that, over time, the program’s effectiveness is weak-
ened.  I therefore suggest that reforms likely to provoke or exacerbate 
these undesirable stakeholder dynamics should be disregarded.  Con-
versely, reforms likely to minimize the effects of power dispersal and 
interest divergence should be adopted.   
In Part I, I describe the basic features of the OIC procedure and 
explain its importance.  I first describe the procedure as it currently 
exists on paper.  I then defend the need for a robust but tailored debt-
forgiveness procedure by arguing that such a procedure (1) enables 
the IRS to collect more revenue, (2) reflects a rich conception of dis-
tributive justice that looks beyond assessed tax liabilities, and (3) com-
ports with the realities of a world in which debtors sometimes cannot 
repay their debts.  Such a system serves society’s interests in debtor 
rehabilitation as well as social and economic stabilization.   
I then turn to a discussion of how OIC has functioned over time.  
In Part II, I discuss two observable trends in the OIC procedure’s re-
 
5 See infra subsection I.B.1. 
6 See infra subsection I.B.1. 
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cent history that give rise to concerns that the procedure is ineffective, 
and I provide some background regarding the historical context in 
which these two trends arose.  I then present, in Part III, a power-
dispersal and interest-divergence analysis of the OIC procedure’s func-
tioning, showing that the dynamics between the four stakeholders 
have caused the procedure to perform less well over time than one 
might have hoped.  I argue that the OIC procedure must be reformed 
to counteract these problematic stakeholder dynamics.  This can hap-
pen by either (1) centralizing power among fewer stakeholders or (2) 
adopting proposals that eliminate or minimize the likelihood of 
downward-spiraling interactions among stakeholders with divergent 
interests.  The second of these strategies is the more promising simply 
because it is difficult to change the realities underlying the relation-
ships and dynamics among the stakeholders.   
Finally, in Part IV, I describe two concrete proposals that align with 
my suggested framework:  (1) empowering an independent decision-
maker to consider offer proposals and (2) making user fees and the 
required partial down payments on offers refundable.  I further argue 
that an alternative reform suggested by the Treasury Inspector General 
for Tax Administration—the introduction by the IRS of more aggres-
sive follow-up collection tactics for rejected OICs—is unlikely to suc-
ceed because such a move would result in unproductive and dissonant 
responses on the part of taxpayers.   
 The OIC procedure is just one discrete tool at the IRS’s disposal, 
but the implications of my analysis are broad.  Thinking analytically 
about whether and how to operate and improve such a program 
demonstrates how stakeholder dynamics can impact tax administra-
tion.  It also opens a window to the consideration of broader philo-
sophical issues and tensions in the area of tax collections, including 
whether a taxing authority can act as an altruistic creditor toward tax 
debtors, how much flexibility is necessary in our system of tax collec-
tions, and what role forgiveness should play in the tax system. 
I.  THE OFFER IN COMPROMISE:  WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT MATTERS 
In this Part, I provide an overview of the OIC procedure and de-
scribe its main features.  I then present three arguments to support the 
proposition that a workable tax-debt forgiveness procedure is an  
important feature of our tax law.  The analysis presented in the remain-
der of this Article is predicated on the assumption that an effective 
system of tax-debt relief is justifiable in at least some situations.   
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A.  The OIC Procedure:  A Brief Description 
The OIC procedure is a method by which a taxpayer may settle her 
unpaid tax debts for an amount less than the full sum of taxes, interest, 
and penalties she owes.  These settlements are distinct from install-
ment agreements, under which a taxpayer who cannot immediately 
pay her taxes in full agrees to pay her debt to the IRS in installments 
over time.7  Section 7122 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the 
IRS to enter into OICs, specifically providing that the IRS may com-
promise a civil or criminal tax case prior to the case being referred to 
the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense.8  
In exchange for the IRS settling the tax debt for less than full 
payment, the taxpayer becomes subject to certain requirements, condi-
tions, and consequences, including a requirement that she file tax re-
turns and remain compliant with the tax laws for the subsequent five 
years.9  The statute of limitations on collection is also suspended while 
the offer is being considered and for the duration of any appeals of 
rejected offers.10  While the OIC is being evaluated and processed, the 
IRS also may credit overpayments of the taxpayer’s other tax liabilities 
against the liability sought to be compromised and many offset such 
overpayments against other liabilities owed to the extent authorized by 
the Code.11   
On the other hand, the taxpayer also receives valuable safeguards.  
For example, the IRS is prohibited from levying on property with re-
spect to the unpaid tax while the offer is pending, for thirty days follow-
ing rejection of the offer, and while a timely appeal is pending.12  Thus, 
 
7 See I.R.C. § 6159 (2006) (authorizing such agreements).  However, under a partial 
payment installment agreement, the taxpayer will not necessarily need to pay the full 
amount of the liability.  See IRM 5.14.2.1 (Mar. 11, 2011).  The most current version of 
the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) is available on the IRS’s website.  Internal Revenue 
Manual, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/irm (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).   
8 I.R.C. § 7122(a).  After the case has been referred to the Department of Justice, the 
power to compromise a tax liability lies with the Attorney General.  Id. 
9 See IRS, FORM 656:  OFFER IN COMPROMISE 3 (2011) [hereinafter IRS, FORM 656]; 
I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 200102001 ( Jan. 12, 2001) (“Should the taxpayer fail to keep 
[the] promise [to comply], the Service may terminate the compromise and take action 
to collect the full balance of the unpaid tax liabilities covered by the compromise.”); see 
also MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ¶ 15.07[8] (2010). 
10 See I.R.C. § 6331(k)(3) (stating that I.R.C. § 6331(i)(5), which suspends the stat-
ute of limitations on collection, also applies to pending OICs and appeals of denied 
OICs).  This discourages taxpayers from submitting offers simply to run out the statute 
of limitations on collection. 
11 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(g)(5) (2002); see also I.R.C. § 6402. 
12 I.R.C. § 6331(k)(1). 
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the OIC procedure offers benefits that make it an attractive option for 
a delinquent taxpayer. 
While the OIC procedure is a creature of statute, looking only to 
the statute and accompanying regulations will not yield a complete 
picture of the procedure’s operation.  Specific details on how the IRS 
executes the OIC procedure are contained in the Internal Revenue 
Manual.13  The Manual also describes four key policy objectives of the 
OIC procedure:   
 Effect collection of what can reasonably be collected at the earliest 
possible time and at the least cost to the government.   
 Achieve a resolution that is in the best interests of both the individual 
taxpayer and the government.   
 Provide the taxpayer a fresh start toward future voluntary compliance 
with all filing and payment requirements.   




However, the Internal Revenue Manual does not specify how to priori-
tize or weight these four objectives.  This lack of guidance, paired with 
the fact that these objectives may conflict, can create implementation 
problems. 
Under the OIC regulations, there are three permissible grounds for 
compromise of a tax liability:  (1) doubt as to collectibility, (2) doubt 
as to liability, and (3) the promotion of effective tax administration.15 
1.  Doubt as to Collectibility 
The IRS most commonly accepts offers for the reason of doubt as 
to collectibility.16  Doubt as to collectibility exists where the taxpayer is 
unable to pay the full amount of the tax liability owed because “the 
taxpayer’s assets and income are less than the full amount of the liabil-
ity.”17  Thus, these OICs require the IRS to determine the taxpayer’s 
ability to pay.18  Treasury Regulations provide that, in determining abil-
ity to pay, taxpayers will be allowed to retain sufficient funds to pay 
 
13 See generally IRM ch. 5.8. 
14 Id. 5.8.1.1.4 (Sept. 23, 2008). 
15 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b). 
16 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-525, IRS OFFERS IN COMPROMISE:  
PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN MIXED; BETTER MANAGEMENT INFORMATION AND SIMPLIFICA-
TION COULD IMPROVE THE PROGRAM 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 GAO REPORT]. 
17 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(2). 
18 Id. § 301.7122-1(c)(2)(i). 
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basic living expenses.19  When calculating basic living expenses, IRS 
guidelines on national and local living expense standards must be con-
sidered, however individual facts and circumstances will also be taken 
into account.20 
Whether a doubt-as-to-collectibility offer will be accepted depends 
on whether the offer reflects the “reasonable collection potential” 
(RCP).21  The Internal Revenue Manual defines the RCP as “the amount 
that can be collected from all available means, including administrative 
and judicial collection remedies.”22  The RCP calculation will generally 
take into account (1) the amount collectible from the taxpayer’s “net 
realizable equity” in her assets, (2) the taxpayer’s expected future in-
come after taking into account necessary living expenses, (3) the 
amount collectible from third parties, and (4) the taxpayer’s income or 
assets that are available to the taxpayer but beyond the reach of the IRS, 
such as property held abroad.23  The “net realizable equity” in an asset is 
the “quick sale value” of the asset minus any amounts owed to lien hold-
ers with priority over the federal tax lien and levy exemption amounts.24  
Essentially, in determining whether a doubt-as-to-collectibility offer 
should be accepted, the IRS has to analyze the taxpayer’s assets, ex-
penses, and liabilities. 
A doubt-as-to-collectibility offer will generally not be accepted 
where the taxpayer is capable of paying the tax in full as a lump sum 
or where the tax is payable under an installment agreement.25  In such 
situations, the offer will be denied unless special circumstances exist to 




21 IRM 5.8.4.3(2) ( June 1, 2010). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 5.8.4.3.1; see also SALTZMAN, supra note 9, ¶ 15.07[6][a]. 
24 IRM 5.8.5.4.1(1) (Oct. 22, 2010).  The “quick sale value” is generally the estimated 
price of an asset where financial pressures have caused the asset’s owner to sell it within 
ninety days.  Id. 5.8.5.4.1(2).  Unless circumstances indicate differently, the IRS gener-
ally presumes the quick sale value to be equal to eighty percent of the asset’s fair mar-
ket value.  Id. 5.8.5.4.1(3).  
25 Id. 5.8.4.3(3) ( June 1, 2010). 
26 Id.  Such special circumstances include economic, public policy, or equity con-
cerns.  IRM 5.8.11.2(2) (Sept. 23, 2008).  The Internal Revenue Manual lists factors to 
consider in making a hardship or public policy/equity determination.  See IRM 5.8.11.2.1; 
id. 5.8.11.2.2. 
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2.  Doubt as to Liability 
Doubt as to liability exists where there is a “genuine dispute” about 
“the existence or amount of the correct tax liability.”27  However, it 
does not exist where there is a final court decision or judgment estab-
lishing the liability.28  Such offers usually arise when a taxpayer seeks to 
contest an assessed tax liability that she failed to petition to the tax 
court within the applicable time period.29  In order for this type of offer 
to be successful, the taxpayer must show that she would suffer a hard-
ship if she had to pay the disputed tax upfront and then later file a 
refund suit.30 
3.  Effective Tax Administration 
As a result of changes brought about by the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,31 there is now a third 
ground for compromising a tax liability—the promotion of “effective 
tax administration” (ETA).32  Under the regulations, an ETA offer may 
be accepted when “collection in full could be achieved, [but] collec-
tion of the full liability would cause the taxpayer economic hardship.”33  
In the absence of economic hardship, the IRS may nonetheless com-
promise a tax liability on ETA grounds “where compelling public policy 
or equity considerations identified by the taxpayer provide a sufficient 
 
27 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(1) (2002). 
28 Id. 
29 SALTZMAN, supra note 9, ¶ 15.07[1][b][i].  The petition filing period is ninety 
days.  Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
I.R.C.). 
32 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(3).  The Committee Report for the IRS Restructur-
ing and Reform Act of 1998 expressed the intent to expand use of the OIC procedure 
beyond the two traditional grounds: 
[T]he conferees expect that the present regulations will be expanded so as to 
permit the IRS, in certain circumstances, to consider additional factors . . . in 
determining whether to compromise the income tax liabilities of individual 
taxpayers.  For example, the conferees anticipate that the IRS will take into ac-
count factors such as equity, hardship, and public policy where a compromise 
of an individual taxpayer’s income tax liability would promote effective tax 
administration. 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 289 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
33 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(i).  The Internal Revenue Manual lists a number 
of factors to consider in determining whether economic hardship exists and provides 
examples of when such hardship is present.  See IRM 5.8.11.2.1 (Sept. 23, 2008). 
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basis for compromis[e].”34  Regardless of whether the ETA offer is 
based on hardship, public policy, or equity, ETA offers will be consid-
ered only if the taxpayer does not qualify for compromise under the 
two traditional bases discussed above.35 
*      *      * 
A taxpayer seeking to compromise her tax liability under the OIC 
procedure must submit her offer on IRS Form 656.36  The submission 
must include detailed information about the taxpayer’s tax liabilities, 
the grounds for the compromise request, the proposed compromise 
amount, and the payment terms.37  The taxpayer must also submit a 
“Collection Information Statement” that requires detailed information 
about her finances.38  If the IRS rejects an offer that contains all of the 
required information, the taxpayer may appeal to the IRS Office of 
Appeals within thirty days by requesting administrative review “in the 
manner provided by the Secretary.”39  If, however, the IRS cannot 
evaluate an offer because the taxpayer provided insufficient infor-
mation (i.e., the offer is “nonprocessable”), or because the offer was 
submitted solely to delay the collection of tax, then the offer will be 
“returned.”40  When OIC documents are “returned” to the taxpayer, it 
is not considered a rejection, and the taxpayer is not entitled to an 
appeal.41  Thus, the right to appeal is contingent on an actual deter-
mination on the merits. 
B.  A Preliminary Case for a Robust Offer-in-Compromise Procedure 
It may not be immediately clear that the OIC procedure is desirable 
or, more generally, that any sort of tax-debt relief procedure is justifia-
 
34 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(ii); see also IRM 5.8.11.2.2 (explaining when non-
hardship ETA offers should be considered); id. 5.8.11.2.2.1 (providing examples of 
factors to consider in making public policy or equity determinations). 
35 IRM 5.8.11.1(5). 
36 IRS, FORM 656, supra note 9. 
37 See SALTZMAN, supra note 9, ¶ 15.07[4]; Steven R. Mather & Paul H. Weisman, 
Federal Tax Collection Procedure—Defensive Measures, TAX. MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, no. 638-3d, 
2010, at A-46 to -48. 
38 IRS, FORM 433-A:  COLLECTION INFORMATION STATEMENT FOR WAGE EARNERS 
AND SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS (2008). 
39 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f)(5)(i). 
40 Id. § 301.7122-1(f)(5)(ii). 
41 Id.  The IRS may also levy to collect the outstanding liability at any time after the 
offer is returned to the taxpayer.  Id. § 301.7122-1(g)(4).  
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ble.  There are a few seemingly obvious arguments against compromis-
ing tax debts.  First, forgiving tax liabilities that have already been as-
sessed may seem facially unfair.  Specifically, it seems inequitable to 
forgive the tax debts of some taxpayers while insisting that others pay 
in full, particularly when the law has already determined that both 
groups owe the same amount of tax.  Second, a viable tax-debt com-
promise procedure may create a moral hazard problem.  If taxpayers 
know that these programs exist, they may be incentivized to engage in 
risky behaviors that may result in an inability to pay the tax in the first 
place.  Third, a robust tax forgiveness program may be hard to justify 
because the government must incur administrative costs to provide 
tax-debt relief.  
The unfairness, moral hazard, and cost arguments relate to three 
traditional criteria of tax policy analysis—equity, efficiency, and admin-
istrability.42  However, the limitations of these traditional analytical cri-
teria have previously been noted in the literature.43  The analysis of 
whether OIC fails to meet these criteria is further complicated by the 
presence of distressed taxpayers who are actually unable to pay their 
tax liabilities.44  Tax policy analysis frequently asks what, in the abstract, 
 
42 The efficiency criterion relates to the moral hazard problem in the sense that in-
formation asymmetry between the IRS and the taxpayer might lead to the provision of 
too much or too little tax-debt forgiveness.   
43 See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP:  TAXES AND 
JUSTICE 38-39 (2002) (“Once we abandon the presumption of the moral significance of 
the pretax world, we see that differential treatment of people with the same income 
may or may not be warranted depending on our overall theory of justice.”); Anthony C. 
Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1220 (2008) (arguing that “traditional tax 
analysis” is “inhospitable” to critical perspectives that take into account the possibility of 
invidious discrimination (citing Charles O. Galvin, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously—
A Comment, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1749 (1998))); Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax 
Scholarship:  Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
365, 380-94 (1998) (describing challenges to traditional tax scholarship); Nancy C. 
Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919, 957-79 (1997) 
(noting that “embedded assumptions found in traditional tax theory” have resulted in a 
failure to consider the positive rights of the poor). 
44 Such a situation may raise questions about the application of tax policy’s “ability 
to pay” or “faculty” concept, which states that taxes should be levied based on the ability 
of each person to pay the tax.  However, there is more than one way to understand 
“ability to pay.”  See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 20-30.  On the one hand, if a 
taxpayer really cannot pay, one might conclude that the underlying system of tax liabil-
ity determination has violated the “ability to pay” concept by overestimating the actual 
ability to pay.  See Sagit Leviner, From Deontology to Practical Application:  The Vision of a 
Good Society and the Tax System, 26 VA. TAX REV. 405, 427-28 (2006) (arguing that focus-
ing on “actual economic standing” instead of “potential economic ability” is the proper 
way to approach the ability to pay principle).  On the other hand, an “endowment” 
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the correct tax policy choice should be.45  However, the application of 
tax policy analysis to this situation—where a taxpayer has already been 
adjudged to owe tax under a given set of rules but is unable to pay—
raises additional complications.  In this situation, other competing pol-
icy considerations may outweigh the traditional tax policy criteria.  
Thus, these traditional tax policy tools may need to be supplemented 
with others, such as concepts from debtor-creditor law, to be applica-
ble in the context of debt forgiveness.   
The three arguments set forth below support constructing and 
implementing a meaningful tax-debt forgiveness procedure.46  The 
discussion, necessarily limited, does not aim to prove that the OIC 
program should necessarily be expanded to any particular extent.  In-
stead, the point is to show that an effective debt forgiveness procedure 
is a justifiable feature of our tax system.  That the procedure needs to 
be reformed is a plausible conclusion given its current state.   
1.  Revenue Benefits 
A well-designed tax-debt forgiveness procedure can increase reve-
nue collections, both for dollars collected from currently outstanding 
accounts and dollars collected through future compliance.  The IRS’s 
existing data supports this argument in two ways.  First, IRS data shows 
that when the IRS rejects a taxpayer’s OIC, the IRS has seldom been 
able to effectively collect on the underlying tax liability.47  The IRS is 
 
understanding of ability to pay would not necessarily lead to this conclusion since it 
focuses on potential ability to pay.  See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 20 (defining 
endowment taxation as taxing people according to their potential to “earn income and 
accumulate wealth”). 
45 Traditional tax policy analysis generally attempts to address theoretical norma-
tive issues.  For example:  What is the appropriate tax base?  Is the treatment of a par-
ticular tax item satisfactory, or can it be reformed?  On what basis should tax law make 
a decision between two alternatives?  See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Fairness in 
International Taxation:  The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 
299, 309 (2001) (discussing the question of “whose ability to pay is relevant in an inter-
national context”); Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to In-
crease Research and Development:  A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, 
and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 69 (2002) (focusing on 
the “abstract goal” of explaining how “allocative-efficiency analyses should be struc-
tured”); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1633 (1999) (attempting to devise a rule for how “a policymaker 
should respond to the typical, real-life situation” of line drawing in the tax code). 
46 These arguments largely support the doubt-as-to-collectibility OIC.   
47 See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 89 (2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 NTA ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting that “over 40 percent of tax modules 
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often unable to collect even the amount the taxpayer offered; in fact, 
many of these taxpayer accounts are deemed “currently not collecti-
ble.”48  The National Taxpayer Advocate (Taxpayer Advocate or NTA)49 
has opined that, while IRS rejections of offers proposed by taxpayers 
would be justified if the IRS were able to then collect more than the 
amounts offered, this has not been the case.50  The collections out-
come data for rejected offers suggests that there are revenue gains to 
be captured by accepting some offers that are currently rejected.   
Second, the IRS generally collects more cents on the dollar 
through accepted OICs than it ultimately collects through its usual 
collections process.  In the 2007 fiscal year, for example, accepted 
OICs generated seventeen cents for each dollar owed, compared to 
the thirteen cents on the dollar the IRS has historically collected on 
two-year-old debts.51  Moreover, the IRS historically has collected al-
 
associated with rejected and withdrawn OICs are ultimately reported as not collectible, 
with many more remaining unresolved in ‘active’ collection status” (footnote omitted)). 
48 The NTA’s 2006 Annual Report notes that from 1998 to 2003, the IRS collected 
less than 50% of what individual taxpayers offered to pay in 44% of cases involving 
rejected OICs, it collected less than 10% of taxpayer-offered amounts in 31% of these 
cases, and it collected nothing in 21% of these cases.  Id.   
49 The National Taxpayer Advocate is an independent position within the IRS created 
as part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights.  See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 
§ 101, 110 Stat. 1452, 1453-56 (1996).  The Taxpayer Advocate supervises the Office of 
the Taxpayer Advocate.  I.R.C. § 7803(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006).  The Office of the Taxpayer 
Advocate is tasked with assisting taxpayers in resolving problems with the IRS, identify-
ing problem areas within the IRS, and proposing legislative and administrative changes.  
Id. § 7803(c)(2)(A).  The Taypayer Advocate is required to submit two annual reports 
to Congress:  an “Objectives” Report in June and an “Activities” Report in December.  
Id. § 7803(c)(2)(B).  The Activities Report must contain a description of at least twenty 
of the most serious problems taxpayers encounter.  Id. § 7803(c)(2)(B)(ii)(III).  The 
current Taxpayer Advocate is Nina E. Olson.   
50 See 2006 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 89 (pointing out that “the ma-
jority of delinquent tax dollars in cases involving rejected OICs tend not to be collect-
ed”); Nina E. Olson, Minding the Gap:  A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax Compliance, 20 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 26 (2009) (noting that for 2008 “in 44% of rejected or with-
drawn offers from individuals, the IRS later collected less than 50% of the amount offered 
by the taxpayer”).  Arguably, taxpayers whose offers are rejected may not have been 
able to successfully complete their proposed offers had they been accepted, and thus 
comparing the amounts offered but rejected to the amounts ultimately collected is 
overly simplistic.  However, if the taxpayer defaults on her OIC, the IRS can immediately 
resume attempts to collect the entire original tax liability.  See Mather & Weisman, supra 
note 37, at A-50.  Thus, there is little downside to the IRS accepting more taxpayer offers. 
51 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 375 (2007) 
[hereinafter 2007 NTA ANNUAL REPORT].  In financial years 2008 and 2009, accepted 
OICs generated twenty cents and eighteen cents on the dollar, respectively.  1 NAT’L 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 205 n.53 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter 2009 NTA ANNUAL REPORT]. 
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most nothing on debts three or more years old.52  These numbers sug-
gest that far from being a drain on the national revenue, a well-
administered tax-debt compromise program can generate more collec-
tions than other methods currently in use.53  The higher collections 
numbers from accepted offers—as compared to both rejected offers 
and the general collections baseline—may possibly be due to the OIC 
program’s ability to draw in additional funds from third-party financial 
supporters of the delinquent taxpayer.54  This factor may explain why 
the IRS has been able to generate increased collection through the 
OIC procedure than through other collections methods.  
Arguably, despite the apparent revenue benefits, making the OIC 
procedure more robust could cause lower levels of tax payment and 
compliance due to increased moral hazard, thereby erasing anticipated 
revenue gains.  However, the user fee and down payment require-
ment,55 as well as the requirement that taxpayers agree to and engage 
in ongoing compliant behaviors, may limit these potential problems.56  
If the submission of such an offer results in costs to the taxpayer—in 
the form of user fees, down payments, or required future compli-
ance—taxpayers are less likely to abuse the procedure or to view their 
failure to pay taxes as costless. 
 
52 2007 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 375.  This may reflect the fact that 
such older debts are likely to be nonpriority tax claims that are dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (listing newer tax liabilities as priority taxes); id. 
§ 523(a)(1) (excepting such priority taxes from bankruptcy discharge).  If so, accepting 
offers in a way that reduces the likelihood of the taxpayer filing for bankruptcy may 
improve IRS collections outcomes for liabilities that might otherwise be discharged. 
53 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2006-30-100, THE OFFER IN COM-
PROMISE PROGRAM IS BENEFICIAL BUT NEEDS TO BE USED MORE EFFICIENTLY IN THE 
COLLECTION OF TAXES 3-7 (2006) [hereinafter TIGTA JULY 2006 FINAL AUDIT REPORT] 
(comparing estimated OIC program labor costs with estimated revenue, and conclud-
ing that in financial year 2004, “[t]he OIC program generated direct revenue in excess 
of the direct cost of administering the program”); see also Olson, supra note 50, at 25-26 
(2009) (characterizing OICs as a “win-win situation for taxpayers and the IRS” and noting 
that “OICs, on average, resulted in more tax collected per dollar owed than traditional 
IRS enforcement efforts and converted a substantial portion of noncompliant taxpayers 
into compliant ones”).   
54 See infra subsections III.A.4 and IV.A.2.   
55 See infra subsections II.A.5-6.  
56 These requirements are similar in effect to deductibles and copayments in the 
insurance context.  See Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 129, 136 (2005) (describing deductibles and co-
insurance as devices used to mitigate moral hazard problems); Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1066 n.224 (2001) (positing that 
“deductibles and co-insurance requirements” are one way in which insured persons are 
incentivized to avoid accidents). 
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Finally, in addition to boosting collection of taxes currently owed, a 
procedure that allows the debtor a “fresh start” and reintegration into 
the world of tax compliance may benefit revenue collection in future 
years.57  The OIC procedure requires that taxpayers have filed all pre-
vious required tax returns; moreover, the taxpayer must remain in 
compliance for the subsequent five years,58 and studies show that a ma-
jority of taxpayers whose OICs are accepted remain in compliance.59  
Thus, in addition to boosting collection of presently owed dollars, the 
forgiveness of tax debts can enhance collections in future tax years.60 
2.  Interrogating the Finality of the Assessed Tax Liability—Toward  
a Broader Conception of Distributive Justice 
An important feature of the OIC procedure that may be particu-
larly troubling to a critical observer is that a taxpayer whose debt is 
compromised is relieved from having to pay a tax liability that has al-
ready been assessed.  Assessment—the step whereby a tax liability is 
recorded—is an important tax event.61  It seems intuitive that failure to 
pay an assessed tax violates fairness or equity requirements.  Horizon-
tal equity, an integral though heavily debated concept in tax policy, 
dictates that “similarly situated” taxpayers should be treated similarly.62  
 
57 The IRS included this “fresh start” policy in a 1992 Policy Statement.  See I.R.S. 
Policy Statement 5-100, IRM 1.2.14.1.17 ( Jan. 30, 1992) (“Acceptance of an adequate 
offer will also result in creating for the taxpayer an expectation of and a fresh start  
toward compliance with all future filing and payment requirements.”). 
58 Mather & Weisman, supra note 37, at A-43; see also IRS, FORM 656, supra note 9 
(requiring the taxpayer to agree to “file tax returns and pay required taxes for the five 
year period beginning with the date of acceptance” of the offer in compromise). 
59 See 2009 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 205 (noting that about eighty 
percent of taxpayers whose offers were accepted between 1995 and 2001 stayed compli-
ant with subsequent tax filing and payment obligations); see also TIGTA JULY 2006 FINAL 
AUDIT REPORT, supra note 53, at 7 (“Taxpayers generally do remain in compliance 
when offers are accepted.”).   
60 Cf. Nina E. Olson, Taxpayer Rights, Customer Service, and Compliance:  A Three-Legged 
Stool, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1239, 1247 (2003) (“[O]ffers provide the IRS with an opportunity 
to bring taxpayers into compliance, particularly when we don’t accept the offer.”). 
61 See I.R.C. § 6201 (2006) (authorizing and requiring the “assessments of all  
taxes . . . imposed by” the Internal Revenue Code); see also SALTZMAN, supra note 9, ¶ 
10.02. 
62 See generally David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 43, 46 (2006) (considering in detail the question of whether “similarly situ-
ated taxpayers [should] necessarily face the same tax burden”); Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1327-28 (2008) (defending the principle of horizontal 
equity); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1990) 
(arguing that horizontal equity, as compared to vertical equity, has greater independent 
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The existence of any tax-debt forgiveness program might seem to con-
travene horizontal equity because, given the same assessed tax amount,63 
such a program would demand full payment from some taxpayers 
while partially releasing others from their obligation.64  A straightfor-
ward tax policy analysis thus might suggest that having any tax-
compromise procedure is a deviation from what is fundamentally fair.   
Yet, despite its intuitive appeal, the amount of tax assessed may not 
reflect whether two individuals are truly similarly situated.  Thus, it 
does not follow that the assessed tax amount should be regarded as a 
perfectly fair and immovable baseline from which any deviations are a 
per se horizontal equity violation.  Interrogating the assessed tax 
amount is a vital step in conceptualizing a richer vision of tax justice 
than one based merely on the income tax return computation, because 
the process of arriving at the assessed tax liability suffers from three 
types of indeterminacy.  I call these baseline indeterminacy, policy in-
determinacy, and computational indeterminacy.  Some aspects of these 
indeterminacies have been previously identified in the scholarly litera-
ture, while other aspects, including the application of such concepts to 
the question of tax-debt forgiveness, are new. 
Baseline Indeterminacy.  As Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel have 
argued, the “pre-tax income baseline”—roughly speaking, the gross 
income65 an individual earns before taxes, which is generally the num-
ber with which tax computation and assessment begin—is not an in-
dependent, neutral dollar amount that is “owned” by the individual.66  
Rather, “pre-tax income” is really a dependent variable because it is 
predicated on the underlying social, economic, and governmental 
structures and conditions that permit such income to be earned in the 
first place.67  It follows that any injustices, inequalities, and disparities 
 
significance when viewed in the real world); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 
FLA. TAX. REV. 191, 192 (1992) (criticizing Musgrave’s approach). 
63 See I.R.C. §§ 6201–6207.  
64 Cf. Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity:  The  
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 613 (1993) (“[W]ith respect to [hori-
zontal equity], once one has decided on the tax base . . . then all that is required is a 
definition of income . . . . [O]nce income is defined, those with equal amounts of in-
come will, by definition, be taxed equally.”). 
65 See I.R.C. § 61 (defining gross income). 
66 MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 175; see also id. (“We have to think of property 
as what is created by the tax system, rather than what is disturbed or encroached on by 
the tax system.  Property rights are the rights people have in the resources they are 
entitled to control after taxes, not before.”).   
67 See id. at 32 (“There is no market without government and no government without 
taxes . . . . In the absence of a legal system supported by taxes, there [could] be . . . none 
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embedded in these underlying structures have the propensity to affect 
a person’s opportunity or ability to earn pre-tax income such that dis-
tributive justice is undermined.  There are many such inequalities and 
disparities.  They include, for example, wage inequalities based on 
gender or race.68  The inherent dependency of the “pre-tax income” 
variable on such inequalities or disparities should make us question 
whether it is equitable to tax two persons the same simply because they 
have accumulated the same amount of gross income.  Put differently, 
if it is the case that Person A—due to underlying social structures and 
known disparities—has put in the same amount of inputs (e.g., effort, 
education, and time) but earns less pre-tax income than Person B, 
then is it fair to tax them equally?69  
This line of thinking has also been explored in the critical tax 
scholarship.  Anthony Infanti, for example, has pointed out the mis-
leadingly “homogenizing” effects of the tax equity concept and the 
 
of the institutions that make possible the existence of almost all contemporary forms of 
income and wealth.  It is therefore logically impossible that people should have any 
kind of entitlement to all their pretax income.”); see also Galle, supra note 62, at 1326-27 
(discussing Murphy and Nagel’s position and noting that “the argument that equals 
must be treated fairly depends on an assumption that we each have come fairly to 
where we now stand”). 
68 See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621-22 (2007) 
(asserting a claim of wage discrimination based on gender under Title VII), superseded 
by statute, Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-35, WOMEN’S EARNINGS:  WORK PATTERNS PARTIALLY 
EXPLAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN’S AND WOMEN’S EARNINGS 57 (2003) (contending 
that because “women are more likely than men to have primary responsibility” for their 
families, they likely make career decisions that result in them earning less income); 
Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Black-White Wage Inequality, Employment Rates, and Incar-
ceration, 111 AM. J. SOC. 553, 558 (2005) (arguing that “because joblessness among 
blacks is relatively high” as compared to whites, “estimates of inequality based just on 
observed wages . . . will underestimate inequality in the economic standing of black 
men”); Laura Fitzpatrick, Why Do Women Still Earn Less than Men?, TIME (Apr. 20, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1983185,00.html (reporting that sex 
discrimination still contributes to the wage disparity between men and women and that 
in 2008 “women still earned only 77 cents on the male dollar”). 
69 Murphy and Nagel have expressed similar reservations in critiquing the tax policy 
notion of “ability to pay,” as expressed through the “equal sacrifice” and “equal propor-
tional sacrifice” concepts.  See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 30 (“If the idea of 
taxation in accordance with ability to pay is made concrete through the principle of 
equal sacrifice, it depends on the radical view that the distribution of welfare produced by 
the market is presumptively just.”).  Other similar critiques have been leveled against the 
use of actual income as the tax base.  See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, 
in TAX JUSTICE:  THE ONGOING DEBATE 123, 124-25 ( Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. 
Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002). 
Oei FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  3/12/2012 2:41 PM 
2012] Getting More By Asking Less 1089 
 
false sense of neutrality that its use has cast over tax policy debates.70  
With regard to equity and distributive justice, then, it is overly simplistic 
to privilege the assessed tax liability as per se fair, and thus it is not 
necessarily unfair to forgive some of that liability in some circumstances.   
Policy Indeterminacy.  Problems surrounding the “myth”71 of pre-tax 
income aside, the indeterminacy of policy choices embedded in the 
computation of tax liability should caution against using the computed 
and assessed tax liability as a privileged standard to argue about hori-
zontal equity.  The federal tax liability computation consists of a series 
of income inclusions, deductions, and credits that are associated with 
particular types of activities—for example, wages from work,72 gains 
from sales of assets,73 and deductions for medical expenses.74  Each of 
these tax “items” represents the choice to select one particular policy 
over other viable options.75  Indeed, different policy choices with re-
spect to each tax item—accompanied by different distributive conse-
 
70 See Infanti, supra note 43, at 1201, 1209 (“By assuming a far more homogeneous 
population than the one that actually exists, horizontal and vertical equity screen from 
the tax policy debate many issues relating to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, 
and disability, and they tend to transmute any remaining issues into ones of economic 
class.”); see also Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the Twenty-First Century:  What’s Tax 
Policy Got to Do with It?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 759, 766, 768 (1999) (discussing 
how the tax laws “exacerbate” employer wage discrimination and proposing solutions 
such as excluding from income the wages of employees who have been discriminated 
against based on race). 
71 See generally MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 20-30. 
72 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2006) (including compensation for services in the defini-
tion of “gross income”).   
73 See id. § 1221 (defining capital assets); see also id. § 61(a)(3).   
74 See id. § 213 (allowing a deduction for certain medical expenses); id. § 162(l) 
(allowing self-employed individuals to deduct health insurance expenditures).   
75 The policy choices embedded in particular decisions to tax, to exempt from tax, 
or to allow as deductions or credits have been long recognized in areas such as tax ex-
penditure analysis and critical tax scholarship. See, e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, A Tax Crit 
Identity Crisis?  Or Tax Expenditure Analysis, Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a Collective 
Identity, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 707, 744-52 (2005) (conceptualizing the tax expenditure 
concept as a deconstructionist analysis of tax law); Edward D. Kleinbard, How Tax  
Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 123 TAX NOTES 925, 925 (2009) 
(discussing how tax expenditures “distort not only tax policy, but also our whole con-
cept of the size and activities of the federal government”); Beverly I. Moran & William 
Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751, 753 
(“[M]any provisions of the Internal Revenue Code deviate from the ideal of taxing all 
income in the comprehensive income tax base.  Sometimes the Code compromises the 
ideal in order to achieve a more administratively practical rule.  More often, Congress 
has decided to encourage particular lifestyles or behaviors by holding out tax benefits 
as an incentive.”). 
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quences—may have been made in the past.76  Each policy choice, of 
course, reflects a decision point where power, special interests, or poli-
tics may have intervened to influence the eventual outcome.77  Further-
more, as between taxpayers at a given income level, any set of policy 
choices will create better results for some than for others.78  Once we 
recognize that the tax law’s treatment of individual tax items is neither 
immutable nor necessarily beyond critique and that any theoretically 
ideal tax base or general principle would deviate in actual policy for-
mulation and implementation, it becomes far less obvious that we 
should default to considering the sum total of all of these policy 
choices (that is, the assessed tax liability amount) as a per se equitable 
outcome.  This is true even if we do generally accept this outcome for 
administrability reasons. 
Executional Indeterminacy.  Finally, even assuming that all of the legal 
and policy choices surrounding each individual tax item are not out-
come indeterminate, our schedule- and tax year–based tax computa-
tion system suffers from a different type of pervasive indeterminacy in 
execution.  Because of the idiosyncrasies and intricacies of the on-the-
ground operation of the tax system, even tax items such as income, 
deductions, and credits that appear reasoned, rational, and equitable 
in the abstract may give rise to irrational or unequal outcomes in prac-
tice.  This “executional indeterminacy” stems from certain underlying 
features of the tax system:  the timing principle that “each tax year 
stands alone,” deviations from this principle that allow losses from one 
year to offset gains from another, the ability of certain taxpayers to use 
certain deductions, and bunching issues79 that lead to certain taxpayers 
being placed in higher or lower tax brackets in seemingly unprincipled 
ways, to name a few issues.   
 
76 The evolving treatment of annuities is an example.  See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ¶ 2.02, at 34-36 (11th ed. 2009). 
77 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE:  A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); see also id. at 38 (arguing “that the political process 
may be corrupted by special interests”); Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 841-43 (2010) (discussing the importance of the policy 
motivations of legislators). 
78 See, e.g., Elkins, supra note 62, at 48-49 (arguing that when the government intro-
duces taxes and subsidies to reduce negative externalities and increase positive ones, 
“horizontal equity is violated in order to further economic efficiency” since “[e]qually 
well-off individuals will pay unequal amounts of tax because of the nature of their pro-
ductive activities or their preferences for education”). 
79 See infra note 81 for a discussion of bunching issues.  
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For example, while horizontal equity from the point of view of an 
ideal tax base might theoretically require the inclusion of all business 
profits in gross income, when a taxpayer is able to carry over losses 
from previous tax years in which perhaps different rates were in effect 
in order to offset her current profits, it may lead to indeterminacy on a 
balance-sheet basis.80  To take another example, a taxpayer who has a 
less consistent level of income than another taxpayer may be pushed 
into a higher tax bracket in some years but a lower bracket in others, 
giving rise to disparate treatment of the two taxpayers despite their 
equivalent earnings overall.81  Tax shelter cases are the most obvious 
incarnation of such executional indeterminacy, wherein rules that are 
logical on their own give rise to irrational outcomes in the right con-
vergence of circumstances.82  Such executional indeterminacy has  
arguably led to the creation of common law doctrines to fill in the 
statutory gaps, such as the assignment-of-income,83 claim-of-right,84 and 
economic substance85 doctrines.  While the comparison may seem 
 
80 See generally I.R.C. §§ 165, 172, 1222 (2006) (permitting deductions related to 
losses).   
81 Take as an example Taxpayer A, who earns $50,000 in Year 1 and $50,000 in Year 
2, and Taxpayer B, who earns $100,000 in Year 1 and $0 in Year 2.  Assuming that tax 
rates stay constant between Year 1 and Year 2, Taxpayer B might be subject to higher 
maximum marginal tax rates in Year 1 than Taxpayer A and hence might have a higher 
tax burden over the two years.  Scholars have presented proposals to fix such “bunch-
ing” problems.  See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor:  Income Averaging Reconsidered, 
40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 397 (2003) (suggesting a tax policy that would permit tax-
payers to “smooth their income over two years for the purpose of calculating the 
[Earned Income Tax Credit]” and “carry back for one year their unused standard de-
ductions and personal and dependent exemptions”). 
82 See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters:  The Problem, Possible 
Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 331 (2002) (proposing 
that a tax shelter be defined as a transaction “that (1) arguably complies as a literal 
matter with the Code and regulations, (2) is accompanied by some level of tax motiva-
tion, and (3) reaches a tax result unintended by Congress or the regulations”). 
83 See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940) (“The power to dispose of 
income is the equivalent of ownership of it.  The exercise of that power to procure the 
payment of income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the in-
come by him who exercises it.”). 
84 See, e.g., N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932) (“If a taxpayer 
receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he 
has received income which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed 
that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged 
liable to restore its equivalent.”). 
85 See, e.g., ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 246 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A] transaction 
that is ‘devoid of economic substance . . . simply is not recognized for federal taxation 
purposes.’” (quoting Lerman v. Comm’r, 939 F.2d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 1991))); see also I.R.C. 
§ 7701(o) (Supp. IV 2011) (codifying the economic substance doctrine). 
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strange and unintuitive, the relief of tax debts at the collections stage 
in certain circumstances may be viewed as a similar “gap filler,” albeit 
one targeted at tax-burden injustices as opposed to tax-shelter abuses. 
Baseline indeterminacy, policy indeterminacy, and executional in-
determinacy all suggest that the computed and assessed tax liability 
should not be viewed as the neutral and equitable “baseline” without 
further investigation.86  Accordingly, a compromise of an assessed tax 
liability is not just a deviation from a neutral baseline.  Rather, the OIC 
procedure should be reconceived as an additional tax instrument that 
has the power, albeit imperfectly, to better account for big-picture, 
balance-sheet inequities between two taxpayers who have the same 
line-item tax computation figure.  Viewed in this light, a functional 
procedure to forgive tax debts is consistent with horizontal equity.  
In conclusion, two points must be reiterated.  First, arguments about 
indeterminacy, standing alone, are inadequate to answer the questions 
of precisely which taxpayer has been subject to inequities and exactly 
whose and how much tax debt should be forgiven.87  The foregoing 
arguments do not attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to these 
questions.  Rather, the point of the discussion is to challenge the 
threshold notion that because tax liability has already been deter-
mined, forgiving such tax liability is a radical step that is necessarily 
unjust.  Critically interrogating that threshold notion is a precondition 
for engaging in a meaningful discussion of whether and how extant 
procedures for tax-debt forgiveness should be reformed.  Second, I do 
not mean to suggest that tax law’s fundamental indeterminacy makes 
tax enforcement or administration impossible or that anarchy in tax 
administration is required and inevitable.  I am simply describing a 
tension that exists between having an administrable and enforceable 
tax collections system and recognizing that tax-debt relief may be justi-
 
86 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 43, at 175 (challenging “the idea that people’s 
pretax income and wealth are theirs in any morally meaningful sense” and arguing that 
“[p]roperty rights are the rights people have in the resources they are entitled to con-
trol after taxes, not before”). 
87 Bankruptcy law confronts the same problem of imperfectly distinguishing be-
tween debtors who deserve relief and those who do not.  See Feibelman, supra note 56, 
at 167 (noting that, “with few exceptions, [bankruptcy] is equally available to the spend-
thrift as it is to the honest but unfortunate debtor”); Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts 
from the Ill and Injured:  The Rhetorical Significance, but Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability 
and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 270-71 (2001) (arguing against then-proposed 
bankruptcy reforms because they would not help better distinguish between deserving 
and undeserving debtors and concluding that “courts will evaluate [such debtors] prin-
cipally on their balance sheets, not on the details of their financial demise”). 
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fied in some circumstances.  Both features are important components 
of good tax administration. 
3.  Negotiating a Reality Where People Sometimes Cannot  
Pay:  Tax Policy Considerations in Dialogue with  
Debtor-Creditor Policy Considerations 
As suggested above, traditional tax-policy analysis standing alone 
may prove insufficient in the “second-best” world in which we live.88  
We do not live in a perfect world in which every debtor unfailingly 
pays her debts.  Rather, we live in a world where credit exists; the 
terms of obtaining credit are not always fair; borrowers sometimes 
cannot repay creditors; debts are sometimes forgiven either through 
the bankruptcy system, through nonbankruptcy debtor-creditor law, or 
through formal or informal agreements between individual debtors 
and creditors negotiated “in the shadow”89 of legal rules; and some 
debts go unpaid.90 
The debtor-creditor world just described includes, of course, tax 
debtors and the sovereign creditor.  In the tax collections context,  
the IRS is, in effect, the creditor, and the delinquent taxpayer is the 
debtor.91  The IRS is compelled to extend credit to the taxpayer as a 
result of imperfections in withholding, the largely annual nature of the 
 
88 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 62, at 192 (arguing that horizontal equity “is achieved 
as a by-product in so many distributive theories because they are usually explicated in a 
first-best world” and that “such theories may not respect [horizontal equity] when they 
are elaborated in a second-best setting”); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity:  A 
Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354, 354 (1993) (drawing a distinction “between viewing 
the problem in a first best setting where taxes can be arranged so as to fully comply 
with equity norms and situations where, due to political or other constraints, the choice 
is among second best solutions”); Musgrave, supra note 62, at 120 (“[W]hen having to 
choose among second-best arrangements, differences in [horizontal equity] might be a 
decisive factor.”). 
89 Cf., e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law:  The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (explaining that parties to a divorce 
“bargain in the shadow of the law” because “the outcome that the law will impose if no 
agreement is reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips”). 
90 See, e.g., Olson, supra note 60, at 1247 (arguing that the OIC program “truly gives 
meaning to the concept of a fair and just tax system, an acknowledgement that facts 
and circumstances may impair even the most sincere taxpayer’s ability to comply with 
the Internal Revenue laws”).   
91 See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 736 (1979) (“The United 
States is an involuntary creditor of delinquent taxpayers, unable to control the factors 
that make tax collection likely.”). 
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filing and collection process, and the availability of filing extensions.92  
The IRS may also be a voluntary creditor in situations in which it enters 
into an installment agreement with the taxpayer or if it agrees to delay 
collection under a payment plan.93  Once the IRS-taxpayer relationship 
is viewed in the real-world context of debtor-creditor relationships and 
distressed debt, it makes sense that taxpayers, like other debtors, will 
sometimes be unable to pay their assessed taxes, interest, and penalties, 
thus requiring a system that effectively copes with these exigencies.   
Of course, the above analysis does not necessarily justify the 
“should not have to pay” situation.94  However, there are several gen-
eral points that are true in the “cannot pay” situation.95  First, in the 
world in which we live, people do sometimes fail to pay, sometimes pay 
late, and sometimes forgive or renegotiate debts.  Second, in our legal 
world, there are systems already in place that permit the settlement of 
debts for less than their full amount.  Accepting this as true, it be-
comes clear that the real question is not whether tax debts should be 
forgiven, but how to manage the compromise process in order to ensure 
the best possible consequences for the taxpayer, the taxing authority, 
and society.96 
While tax policy analysis has scarcely confronted this set of ques-
tions, scholars of debtor-creditor relations have long recognized that a 
system that forgives some debts can yield benefits and that these benefits 
may outweigh the costs.97  For example, some bankruptcy scholars have 
pointed to the social insurance function of our consumer bankruptcy 
system.98  From this perspective, the existence of a federal bankruptcy 
 
92 In this sense, the IRS’s position may not be so different from that of other invol-
untary creditors, such as tort victims.  See generally David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, 
Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1601 (1991). 
93 See I.R.C. § 6159 (2006) (authorizing the use of installment agreements). 
94 In other words, the analysis does not address the situation in which the tax debtor 
can pay but perhaps should not have to do so, based on hardship or other grounds.  
That is, it does not justify offers based on Effective Tax Administration or Doubt as to 
Liability.  Cf. Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 73-75 (describing dif-
ferences between “can’t-pays” and “won’t-pays” in the OIC context). 
95 These are situations presented by the doubt-as-to-collectibility offer. 
96 I develop these concepts further in subsequent work.  See Shu-Yi Oei, Who Wins 
When Uncle Sam Loses?  Social Insurance and the Forgiveness of Tax Debts ( Jan. 18, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).   
97 See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 87, at 239 (“The standard justification for uncondi-
tional debt relief . . . is that debt relief brings significant social and economic benefits 
to the larger community.”). 
98 See, e.g., Feibelman, supra note 56, at 129-30 & nn.2-3 (surveying the literature 
that discusses bankruptcy as theoretical or functional social insurance); Todd J. Zywicki, 
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procedure reflects society’s decision that it is beneficial to smooth the 
consumption power of individual debtors in times of financial distress 
by letting them discharge debt through a unified proceeding, with 
such discharge being funded ex ante via higher borrowing costs.99  The 
price of or premium for this social insurance is borne by debtors in the 
form of increased interest rates, and the risk of debtor default is 
spread to creditors in exchange for increased upfront costs of borrow-
ing.100  Other bankruptcy scholars have pointed out that the bankruptcy 
system is part of the nation’s social safety net.101  In addition, the value 
of debtor rehabilitation and the resulting “fresh start” are central policy 
concerns in debtor-creditor and bankruptcy scholarship.102  The con-
tinued existence of a federal bankruptcy procedure shows that lingering 
concerns—about moral hazard, about whether a given debtor deserves 
forgiveness, and about the fairness of forgiving only some debts—have 
not, by themselves, been sufficient to trump the societal benefits noted 
above.  These concerns can, in fact, be offset by other competing policy 
rationales. 
 
An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1473 
(2005) (describing the traditional model of bankruptcy as “a form of insurance designed 
to protect individuals from overwhelming indebtedness or from sudden and unexpected 
exogenous shocks to their incomes or expenses”).   
99 See Feibelman, supra note 56, at 130 (“[B]ankruptcy relief . . . satisfies the basic 
economic definition of insurance.  It transfers risk from a debtor (the insured) to his or 
her creditor (the insurer), for which the creditor seeks compensation in the form of an 
increased interest rate.”); see also Zywicki, supra note 98, at 1473. 
100 See Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net:  Fresh Start or 
Treadmill?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2004) (arguing that consumers pay for 
this social safety net “in higher interest and in the stress and stigma of the experience 
both of bankruptcy and over-indebtedness,” but noting that “the credit industry also 
pays to some extent in lower profits”).  The transfer of risk to creditors in exchange for 
a price is what allows bankruptcy to meet the theoretical definition of insurance. 
101 See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS:  AMERICANS IN 
DEBT 3-5 (2000) (summarizing the findings of an empirical study of debtors who filed 
for bankruptcy and concluding that the system’s “social safety net” function provided 
“people who were once solidly middle class . . . a chance . . . to retain their middle-class 
status”).   
102 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“One of the primary pur-
poses of the bankruptcy act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppres-
sive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and 
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.’” (citing Williams v. U.S. Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915))); see also Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” 
Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy:  A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 49, 53 (1986) (discussing the history of the “fresh start” theory and its “current 
manifestation” in the bankruptcy code).  
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As in the bankruptcy context, social insurance, social safety net, 
and debtor-rehabilitation concerns are important considerations in 
the context of nonbankruptcy tax-debt relief.  From a social-insurance 
standpoint, for example, one might argue that imposing higher effec-
tive tax rates on all taxpayers to compensate for relief of tax debts for 
some under certain circumstances is justifiable, because the transfer of 
risk from taxpayer debtors to the government creditor in exchange for 
a price facilitates important social policy goals.103  From a social safety 
net perspective, the forgiveness of tax debts by the government-
creditor is substantially the same as direct government spending on 
transfer and welfare programs, because both represent a revenue 
cost.104  Finally, when viewed as a “fresh start” for tax debtors, a key  
requirement—and a key revenue benefit—of the OIC procedure is 
that the taxpayer must remain in compliance with the tax laws for the 
next five years.  Thus, just like the bankruptcy system, the OIC proce-
dure has the potential to rehabilitate tax debtors into compliance. 
Social insurance, social safety net, and “fresh start” arguments for 
debt relief take on added complexity in the tax-debts arena because of 
the unique nature of the relationship between the sovereign as credi-
tor and taxpayer as debtor.  The IRS is different from private creditors 
because the government also provides welfare, transfers, and other 
benefits to its citizens.  In other words, the government’s function has 
both a taxing side and a spending side.105  It does not benefit society if 
the government as creditor exacts too much from a struggling tax 
debtor, leaving the taxpayer economically vulnerable and dependent 
upon the government’s social safety net spending.106 
The argument can also be expressed in terms of revenue expendi-
tures:  tax collection is only one side of the revenue equation.  Spending 
on the social safety net constitutes the other side.  In cases where ex-
penditures and other costs are likely to outweigh collections, it may be 
better for the national balance sheet if the government forgives some 
 
103 For a more extended discussion, see Oei, supra note 96. 
104 But see id. (arguing that forgiveness of tax debts may have different distributive 
consequences than direct social welfare programs).  
105 The spending side encompasses welfare and benefits spending as well as tax  
expenditures.     
106 The Taxpayer Advocate has expressed similar concerns about the IRS’s use of liens 
and levies.  See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 21-24 
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 NTA ANNUAL REPORT] (“At a time when so many homes are 
in foreclosure, the IRS should use caution when issuing federal tax liens, which are 
often more damaging than bankruptcy to taxpayers’ attempts to secure credit.”). 
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tax debts that would otherwise cause delinquent debtors to become 
dependent upon the social safety net.   
On the other hand, there are countervailing revenue considera-
tions.  In order to provide a social safety net and any public goods, the 
government needs to raise revenue.  That the sovereign creditor has 
revenue-raising and public-provision functions suggests that the IRS 
should perhaps be less willing to forgive tax debtors or should forgive 
fewer cents for each dollar owed than a private creditor would.107  In 
addition, other arguments in favor of consumer debt relief are not 
pertinent to the tax-debtor context.  For example, unfair lending prac-
tices and information and power disparities between sophisticated lend-
ers and consumer debtors simply do not apply in the case of tax debts.108   
These two considerations may suggest that the level of debt relief 
provided by the sovereign creditor should be less than that undertaken 
by a private creditor.  However, neither consideration leads to the 
conclusion that the sovereign creditor should not forgive tax debts at 
all.  Instead, these considerations, if accepted, yield two articulable 
rules.  First, the sovereign creditor should forgive tax debts in an 
amount larger than zero but somewhat less than nongovernment cred-
itors would forgive.  And second, the government should cease to col-
lect delinquent taxes at the point where the costs of collection—
including any resulting costs to the government of increased societal 
support to the taxpayer, costs to other taxpayers, and costs of OIC 
program administration—exceed the benefits of collection, including 
the concrete benefit of collecting the amount of outstanding tax 
owed.109  While the exact magnitude of debt relief may be difficult to 
calculate, a principled approach to the question is possible. 
 
107 See Barbara K. Morgan, Should the Sovereign Be Paid First?  A Comparative Interna-
tional Analysis of the Priority for Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 463 
(2000) (noting the argument that bankruptcy priority for tax claims “protects the revenue 
base for the common good, and avoids shifting the burden of the debtor’s unpaid taxes 
to other taxpayers” (footnotes omitted)); see also Adam Feibelman, Federal Bankruptcy 
Law and State Sovereign Immunity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1381, 1409 (2003) (noting that state 
creditors “often have a dual purpose—pecuniary and regulatory—for pursuing tax 
claims”). 
108 Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
72 (2008) (“In theory, lenders can be deterred from offering unsafe credit products by 
the threat that debt incurred through such unsafe products will be discharged in bank-
ruptcy.  The potential efficacy of such a threat is evident from lenders’ intense lobbying 
to restrict consumers’ access to bankruptcy.”). 
109 But cf. Kaplow, supra note 2, at 223 (“[O]ptimal enforcement will be dictated not 
only by its direct resource cost and the revenue it raises, but also by the distortion it 
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 Two other considerations must be mentioned in conclusion.  
First, the extent to which distressed taxpayers should be relieved of 
their tax debts will necessarily depend on the factual exigencies and 
background legal rules surrounding the tax debt owed.  For example, 
if the delinquent taxpayer also owes money to other creditors, then 
the tax authority should consider whether private creditors instead of 
the taxpayer will capture the benefits of any tax-debt relief.110  Factors 
such as whether the taxpayer is insolvent, the relationship between the 
taxpayer and her other creditors, the amount and type of debt that she 
owes, and the underlying laws, including bankruptcy and state debtor-
creditor laws, will determine whether this benefit transfer to nongov-
ernmental creditors occurs.    
Second, a successful procedure for bilateral tax-debt relief must 
determine how such a procedure will interact with other legal provisions 
for debt relief—most notably, the federal bankruptcy laws.  Two im-
portant concepts in federal bankruptcy law are priority of claims111 and 
dischargeability of claims.112  The rules for priority set forth the order 
in which claims are paid out.113  The IRS can have a secured, unsecured, 
or undersecured tax claim in a bankruptcy proceeding.114  In addition, 
certain unsecured tax claims are designated “priority claims,” meaning 
that they receive priority in payment over general unsecured claims.115  
The bankruptcy discharge generally voids any judgments with respect 
to discharged debts116 and prohibits creditors from collecting on dis-
charged debts.117  However, some debts, including certain tax debts, 
are excepted from discharge, which means that the creditor will not be 
enjoined from collecting on such debts after the conclusion of the 
 
causes, the distortion caused by increases in tax rates, and the marginal benefit of gov-
ernment expenditures.”). 
110 For a more thorough analysis, see Oei, supra note 96. 
111 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (codifying the priority of claims). 
112 See id. § 727 (describing discharge in Chapter 7 cases); id. § 1141(d) (noting that 
Chapter 11 plan confirmation generally discharges pre-confirmation debts). 
113 Id. § 507.  
114 For a discussion of the status of tax clams in bankruptcy, see William Tatlock, 
Discharge of Indebtedness, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, no. 540-3D, 
2010, at A-4 to -5, which analyzes the general classification of federal tax claims in 
bankruptcy.  See also Mather & Weisman, supra note 37, at A-56 (same).   
115 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (granting eighth priority to “unsecured claims of gov-
ernment units,” subject to some conditions). 
116 See id. § 524(a)(1) (voiding judgment with respect to discharged debts). 
117 See id. § 524 (describing the effects of discharge); see also id. § 727(b) (stating 
that creditors may not collect on debts arising before the date of the order for relief 
issued in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case). 
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bankruptcy case.118  While a detailed description of the treatment of tax 
claims in bankruptcy is beyond the scope of this Article,119 the priority 
status of the tax liability and whether it is dischargeable in bankruptcy 
will clearly affect the sovereign’s determination of how much liability 
to forgive, and therefore should influence the ultimate design of a tax 
compromise procedure.120 
*      *      * 
The arguments outlined above provide preliminary support for the 
development and institution of a viable procedure for the forgiveness 
of tax debts, but the discussion is necessarily limited.  The arguments I 
have presented are primarily applicable to taxpayers that are natural 
persons, and may be less applicable to situations involving entity or 
nonhuman taxpayers.  In these situations, the interests involved might 
be less about fairness, social insurance, or a fresh start for the debtor 
and more about preserving business value.  These arguments do not 
offer a foolproof method of distinguishing between taxpayers who are 
unable to pay and those who simply will not pay, nor do they establish 
a method of distinguishing between taxpayers who have suffered ineq-
uities and deserve relief and those who have simply made bad deci-
sions, perhaps with the expectation of being bailed out.121  However, 
 
118 See id. § 523(a)(1) (listing several exceptions, including certain tax or customs 
duties). 
119 The treatment of tax debts in bankruptcy has been described elsewhere.  See, e.g., 
Gregory Germain, Discharging Income Tax Liabilities in Bankruptcy:  A Challenge to the New 
Theory of Strict Construction for Scrivener’s Errors, 75 UMKC L. REV. 741, 744-45 (2007) 
(addressing the potentially “profound effect” on the priority rules for tax debts of a 
minor grammatical change introduced by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2005); Jack F. Williams, Rethinking Bankruptcy and Tax Policy, 3 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1995) (analyzing “conflicts between bankruptcy 
and tax policy” and “the special treatment afforded tax claims in bankruptcy” with the 
hope of “beginning to build an analytical model providing a coherent and internally 
consistent logic of bankruptcy taxation”); Burton J. Haynes, Handling Bankruptcy Tax 
Debts After BAPCPA, MD. B.J., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 20 (summarizing features of the Bank-
ruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005). 
120 The optimal way in which IRS procedures for tax-debt relief should interact with 
bankruptcy proceedings has not yet been explored in the literature and is an avenue I 
explore in future research.  See Oei, supra note 96. 
121 But see Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 73-77 (2009) (describ-
ing tax collection as a “dynamic process” of classifying taxpayers as “can’t-pays” or 
“won’t-pays”).  Distinguishing between “can’t-pays” and “won’t-pays” is actually a deeply 
complex inquiry.  The fundamental distinction is not one that can be resolved simply 
by looking at the taxpayer’s financial snapshot because this will not reflect the motiva-
tions and circumstances surrounding the taxpayer’s decisions that led to her current 
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this shortcoming is to some extent unsurprising, since distinguishing 
between deserving and undeserving debtors is a problem that also 
confronts our bankruptcy system and remains imperfectly resolved in 
that context.  Ultimately, a full theoretical or philosophical treatment 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, I develop these concepts 
further and discuss theoretical and practical problems associated with 
their implementation in a workable system of tax-debt forgiveness, in a 
later work.122 
II.  THE PROCEDURE IN ACTION:  TWO PROBLEMATIC  
TRENDS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
While the arguments above do not describe the precise shape the 
OIC procedure should take, a strong argument can be made that the 
procedure could be more effective.  Commentators such as the Tax-
payer Advocate, the U.S. Government Accountability Office,123 and 
practitioners have recently criticized the procedure.  Most of these 
criticisms stem from observations about two recent problematic trends:  
(1) a growing inventory backlog and longer processing times,124 and 
(2) declines in offer submissions and acceptances paired with increases 
in returns to taxpayers of “non-processable” offer submissions.125  This 
Part discusses these two trends.  These trends, however, cannot be un-
derstood independently of the historical context from which they 
 
situation.  Put differently, even if the tax system were able to accurately separate out 
“can’t-pay” taxpayers from “won’t-pay” taxpayers on a snapshot basis, this would not 
adequately interrogate the personal choices or exigencies that led the tax debtor to her 
present situation.  Two taxpayers who cannot pay based on current asset levels may 
have arrived at that point through very different circumstances.  Thus, the project of 
accurately distinguishing deserving from undeserving debtors is almost impossible.  See 
Jacoby, supra note 87, at 233 (noting that “the principles of repayment and culpability 
which instinctively seem like relevant factors to distinguish [an undeserving taxpayer’s] 
entitlement to debt relief from [a deserving taxpayer’s] actually play very little systematic 
role in the U.S. bankruptcy system”); see also Feibelman, supra note 56, at 167.   
122 See Oei, supra note 96. 
123 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is a congressional agency that 
serves as a “watchdog” for federal government accountability and job performance.  See 
About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (describing the GAO’s mission, values, and responsibilities).  
The GAO performs its work at the request of congressional committees and subcom-
mittees, and its duties include “auditing agency operations to determine whether federal 
funds are being spent efficiently and effectively,” “reporting on how well government 
programs and policies are meeting their objectives,” and “performing policy analyses 
and outlining options for congressional consideration.”  Id. 
124 See infra subsection II.B.1. 
125 See infra subsection II.B.2. 
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arose.  Thus, to contextualize this analysis, I begin with a brief overview 
of watershed events in the OIC procedure’s evolution over the last two 
decades. 
A.  Watershed Moments in the Procedure’s Recent History 
A statute authorizing tax-liability compromise has existed since at 
least 1863.126  Of course, the content of the statute, as well as its inter-
pretation and administration, have since evolved.  The statute’s early 
history is not relevant for our purposes and as such this Article will focus 
on changes to the procedure that have occurred since the passage of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986,127 the last major legislation to overhaul 
the tax code.  
1.  1992 Changes 
In 1992, the IRS issued Policy Statement 5-100, which represented 
a significant change from the IRS’s prior policy concerning the OIC 
procedure.128  Prior to the Policy Statement’s release, the OIC proce-
dure was little known and seldom used, and the IRS accepted an offer 
only if it resulted in “maximum collection with the least possible loss or 
 
126 Section 10 of the Act of March 3, 1863, provided, 
[U]pon a report by a district attorney, or any special attorney or agent having 
charge of any claim in favor of the United States, showing in detail the condi-
tion of such claim, and the terms upon which the same may be compromised, 
and recommending that the same be compromised upon the terms so offered, 
and upon the recommendation of the solicitor of the treasury, the Secretary  
of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, authorized to compromise such claim ac-
cordingly. 
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 76, § 10, 12 Stat. 737, 740-41.  Section 102 of the Act of July 20, 
1868, subsequently provided, in part, that  
in all cases arising under the internal revenue laws where, instead of commenc-
ing or proceeding with a suit in court, it may appear to the commissioner of in-
ternal revenue to be for the interest of the United States to compromise the 
same, he is empowered and authorized to make such compromise with the ad-
vice and consent of the Secretary of the Treasury . . . . 
Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, § 102, 15 Stat. 125, 166.   
127 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections  
of I.R.C.).   
128 See I.R.S. Policy Statement 5-100, IRM 1.2.14.1.17 ( Jan. 30, 1992) (relaxing the 
standards under which the IRS would accept an offer); see also PAUL M. PREDMORE, IRS 
OFFERS IN COMPROMISE (2001), available at http://www.gslaw.com/resources/pdf/ 
IRS_compromise.pdf (describing the change as a “shift in IRS policy”). 
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cost to the government.”129  The 1992 Policy Statement provided in-
stead that the IRS would accept offers “when it is unlikely that the tax 
liability can be collected in full and the amount offered reasonably 
reflects collection potential.”130  The OIC program, the Statement fur-
ther explained, is “a legitimate alternative to declaring a case currently 
not collectible or to a protracted installment agreement,” and “[t]he 
goal is to achieve collection of what is potentially collectible at the earliest 
possible time and at the least cost to the government.”131  Thus, the 
1992 Policy Statement reflected a clear shift in approach.132 
The Statement also reflected other taxpayer-friendly positions.  
First, it required IRS employees to “discuss the compromise alternative 
with the taxpayer and, when necessary, assist in preparing the required 
forms” in situations where an OIC appears to be a “viable solution.”133  
Second, it stated that “[t]he ultimate goal is a compromise which is in 
the best interest of both the taxpayer and the Service.”134  And third, it 
envisioned that acceptance of OICs would “result in creating for the 
taxpayer an expectation of and a fresh start toward compliance with all 
future filing and payment requirements.”135  
In the same year, the IRS also made substantial changes to provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Manual that govern OICs to reflect the 
Service’s new approach.136  Such changes included simplified financial 
disclosure forms and more relaxed asset-valuation guidelines.137   
 
129 PREDMORE, supra note 128, at 1 (emphasis added) (quoting IRM 57(1) 1.4 (Aug. 
24, 1989)); see also IRS Restructuring:  Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
105th Cong. 459-60 (1998) [hereinafter IRS Restructuring Hearings] (statement of the 
Illinois State Bar Association) (stating that the new procedures “greatly increased the 
chances that a troubled taxpayer might be able to make a partial payment in settlement 
of his tax liability”); PREDMORE, supra note 128, at 3 (noting significant increase in offers 
received and accepted after the issuance of Policy Statement 5-100 in 1992). 
130 I.R.S. Policy Statement 5-100, supra note 128.   
131 Id. (emphasis added).   
132 This shift reflected an IRS initiative to bring taxpayers back into compliance by 
2000.  See PREDMORE, supra note 128, at 1 (explaining the motivation behind Policy 
Statement 5-100). 
133 I.R.S. Policy Statement 5-100, supra note 128.  However, the taxpayer still retains 
responsibility for making the OIC proposal. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 PREDMORE, supra note 128, at 2. 
137 Id.  As Paul Predmore explained, 
The most significant IRM changes included:  (1) IRS personnel were instructed 
to discuss the possibility of an offer in compromise with taxpayers whose finan-
cial position make it unlikely that their tax debt will be paid in full; (2) collect-
ibility offers were to be processed by a Revenue Officer, often one familiar with 
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2.  1995 Introduction of Nationalized Standards 
In August 1995, the IRS started to use national and local standards 
to determine “ability to pay” for purposes of considering taxpayer offers, 
an approach that persists today.138  These standards established expenses 
considered “allowable” in evaluating a taxpayer’s ability to pay.139  
While necessary expenses for housing and utilities were standardized 
locally, other necessary expenses, such as for food, medical supplies, 
and clothing, were standardized nationally.140  In addition to “neces-
sary” expenses, the IRS also established “conditional” expenses.141  
However, conditional expenses were used only to evaluate ability to 
pay if the entire tax obligation could be paid off within three years.142  
Some commentators subsequently argued that the standards were rigid 
and unrealistic and that they had adverse effects on taxpayers looking 
to compromise a tax liability.143  
3.  1998 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act 
The 1998 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act (the 1998 Act or the 
1998 Restructuring Act) was a watershed piece of tax legislation that 
introduced important changes to various tax administration provi-
sions.144  The Act’s many changes included changes to the OIC stat-
 
the account, rather than by Special Procedures Function; (3) simplified finan-
cial disclosure forms; (4) more liberal valuation guidelines and considerations 
for certain property interests; (5) a present value analysis of the taxpayer's cur-
rent ability to make installment payments over a sixty-month period; (6) a five-
year compliance period upon acceptance of the offer; and (7) discouraged use 
of collateral agreements with the offer. 
Id. 
138 Id. at 4 (citing IRM 5323.12(1) (Aug. 29, 1995)); see also IRM 5.8.5.20 (Oct. 22, 
2010); id. 5.8.5.20.1; id. 5.15.1.7; id. 5.15.1.8; id. 5.15.1.9. 
139
 PREDMORE, supra note 128, at 4. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 IRM 5323.12(1)(b) (Aug. 29, 1995).  Under the current IRM, conditional ex-
penses are no longer allowable in evaluating OICs.  IRM 5.8.5.2(1) (Oct. 22, 2010).  
143 See, e.g., IRS Restructuring Hearings, supra note 129, at 460 (statement of the Illi-
nois State Bar Association) (arguing that national standards mean that “a taxpayer’s 
ability to pay a tax liability is no longer based upon the taxpayer’s particular facts and 
circumstances,” that the IRS’s employees lack discretion to determine whether an offer 
will facilitate collection, and characterizing adoption of national standards as an “im-
pediment” to tax collection); see also infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
144 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
I.R.C.).  The Act has been the subject of much scholarly attention.  See, e.g., Camp, Fail-
ure of Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 77-80 (noting the Act’s importance in establish-
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ute.145  These changes were motivated partly by mounting criticism of 
both the OIC program and other IRS practices and procedures.146  
This criticism included claims that the IRS was using “enforcement 
minded revenues officers” to administer the program,147 that the IRS 
was using overly rigid and unrealistic national standards for evaluating 
and accepting offers,148 and that IRS revenue officers were being told 
by management to ignore the law.149  In the 1998 Act, Congress added 
a provision to the OIC statute that required the Treasury to prescribe 
employee guidelines for determining the circumstances under which a 
submitted offer is adequate and should be accepted and to take a 
 
ing “collection due process”); Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process, supra 
note 1, at 91 (highlighting the Act’s “significant structural changes”); Cords, supra note 
1, at 440 (describing how the Act sought to “increase taxpayer rights” and “reduce 
some of the inequities”); Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due?  I.R.C. Sections 6320 
and 6330 Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51, 62-65 (2004) (analyzing the 
law and its effects on collection due process hearings); Lederman, supra note 1, at 972 
(discussing the “enormous changes” brought about by the Act). 
145 See generally Paul M. Predmore, IRS Offers in Compromise:  An Historical Look and 
What’s New (confirming the IRS trend toward encouraging more compromise offers), 
in TAX CONTROVERSIES:  WHAT TO DO WHEN THE IRS CALLS 211, 218-19 (2001).  In 
1996 some minor legislative changes occurred.  The 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 
dramatically raised the threshold dollar amount above which the Treasury Department 
General Counsel (or her delegate) would be required to file a statement of the reasons 
for accepting an OIC.  Prior to this change, the threshold figure was $500.  I.R.C. 
§ 7122(b) (1994) (amended 1996).  Effective July 30, 1996, no General Counsel opin-
ion would be required for the compromise of civil tax cases in which the unpaid tax 
liability (including interest, additional amounts, additions to tax, and penalties) was 
less than $50,000.  Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 503(a), 110 Stat. 
1452, 1461 (1996) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7122(b) (2006)).  However, such 
OICs would be newly subject to “continuing quality review by the Secretary.”  Id.  The 
previous $500 threshold made little sense.  See, e.g., Christopher J. Fenn, The New IRS 
Offers in Compromise Policy, J. ACCT., Nov. 1992, at 75, 77 (characterizing the old law as 
“every bit as sensible as the New England blue law prohibiting taking a bath on Sunday” 
and explaining that when the limit was set over sixty years ago, “$500 was equivalent to 
several months’ wages of most Americans”). 
146 See IRS Restructuring Hearings, supra note 129, at 308 (statement of Michael E. 
Mares, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) (describing how the IRS 
and its employees had been “the subject of unprecedented criticism”). 
147 Id. at 99 (statement of Bryan E. Gates, Chair, Federal Regulatory Subcommittee, 
National Association of Enrolled Agents). 
148 See id. at 225 (statement of Donald C. Alexander, former Comm’r, Internal Rev-
enue Service) (encouraging the IRS to use more “liberal standards” in the compromise 
program). 
149 See id. at 186 (statement of Sen. William V. Roth, Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Fin.) (expressing his concerns regarding testimony from a revenue officer who said 
management pressured officers to ignore legal issues that might slow down collection); 
see also id. at 274 (statement of Sheldon S. Cohen, Former Comm’r, Internal Revenue 
Service) (“This is a management problem, not a problem with the law.”). 
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“facts and circumstances” approach in making such a determination.150  
The Act called for the Secretary to “develop and publish schedules of 
national and local allowances designed to provide that taxpayers enter-
ing into a compromise have an adequate means to provide for basic 
living expenses.”151  The GAO subsequently commented that the IRS 
had fulfilled this congressional directive.152 
Prior to the 1998 Act, the only grounds for accepting an OIC were 
doubt as to collectibility and doubt as to liability.  The conference re-
port accompanying the 1998 Act evinced Congress’s expectation that 
the Treasury Regulations would be expanded to permit the IRS to 
consider other factors.153  The Treasury responded to Congress by en-
acting and finalizing regulations that allowed the IRS to compromise 
liabilities in situations where compromise would promote “effective tax 
administration.”154  
The 1998 Act introduced the further requirement that the IRS  
establish “independent administrative review of any rejection of a pro-
posed offer-in-compromise” before communicating the rejection to 
the taxpayer, as well as a process for taxpayers to appeal rejections to the 
IRS Office of Appeals.155  In final Treasury Regulations promulgated on 
July 19, 2002, however, the Treasury took the position that taxpayers 
would not have the right to appeal where the taxpayer submitted the 
offer solely to delay collection, where the taxpayer did not submit the 
required information, or where the offer was returned as “nonpro-
 
150 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, § 3462(a), 112 
Stat. 685, 764-65 (codified at I.R.C. § 7122(d)). 
151 Id. § 3462(a), 112 Stat. at 765. 
152 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-311, TAX ADMINISTRATION:  IRS SHOULD 
EVALUATE THE CHANGES TO ITS OFFER IN COMPROMISE PROGRAM 31 (2002) [hereinafter 
2002 GAO REPORT]. 
153 As the conference report stated, 
[T]he conferees expect that the present regulations will be expanded so as to 
permit the IRS, in certain circumstances, to consider additional factors (i.e., 
factors other than doubt as to liability or collectibility) in determining whether 
to compromise the income tax liabilities of individual taxpayers.  For example, 
the conferees anticipate that the IRS will take into account factors such as equity, 
hardship, and public policy where a compromise of an individual taxpayer’s in-
come tax liability would promote effective tax administration. 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 289 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
154 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(ii) (2003) (stating that “compelling public 
policy or equity considerations” may justify a compromise that would not otherwise be 
approved); id. § 301.7122-1(c)(3) (providing examples of compromises that achieve 
“effective tax administration”). 
155 § 3462(c)(1), 112 Stat. at 766 (codified at I.R.C. § 7122(e)). 
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cessable” because returns for these reasons would not constitute a  
rejection.156  
Finally, the 1998 Act provided that offers from low-income taxpay-
ers could not be rejected “solely on the basis of the amount of the of-
fer.”157  In the Act’s legislative history, Congress expressed its desire 
that the IRS do a better job of informing taxpayers that the OIC pro-
cedure is available to resolve tax debts.158  
4.  2001 Introduction of Centralized Processing 
The year 2001 saw important changes in the administration of the 
OIC procedure.  In 2001, the IRS stopped processing all offers in field 
offices, instead establishing centralized processing centers in Brookhaven, 
New York, and Memphis, Tennessee, for processing certain offers.159  
Under centralized processing, simpler OICs would generally be pro-
cessed in Brookhaven and Memphis, while more complex offers would 
continue to be processed by local field offices.160  This move was made 
to reduce case inventory backlog and processing times.161  However, 
centralized processing subsequently came under fire for ultimately 
reducing the effectiveness of the program.162  
 
156 Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(f)(5)(ii); see also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying 
text. 
157 § 3462(a), 112 Stat. at 765 (codified at I.R.C. § 7122(d)(3)(A)). 
158 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 289 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (“[T]he IRS should make 
it easier for taxpayers to enter into offer-in-compromise agreements, and should do 
more to educate the taxpaying public about the availability of such agreements.”); see 
also 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 13 (describing IRS efforts to inform the pub-
lic of OIC options, including “outreach and education efforts”). 
159 See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 19; see also 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVO-
CATE, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 313 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 NTA ANNUAL 
REPORT] (discussing various aspects of the “OIC inventory reduction strategy” that 
involved centralized processing in Brookhaven and Memphis); TREASURY INSPECTOR 
GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2003-30-182, CONTINUED PROGRESS IS NEEDED 
TO IMPROVE THE CENTRALIZED OFFER IN COMPROMISE PROGRAM 1-3 (2003) (summarizing 
progress of the “Centralized Offer in Compromise” program). 
160 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2005-30-013,  
IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED IN THE TIMELINESS AND ACCURACY OF OFFERS IN COMPRO-
MISE PROCESSED BY FIELD OFFER GROUPS 3 (2004); see also 2004 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 159, at 313. 
161 See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 18 (outlining efforts to improve  
efficiency). 
162 For example, some practitioners have complained that using the “strict gate-
keeper” model to reduce backlog creates the illusion of programmatic success by sum-
marily returning offers with minor incompleteness to the taxpayer.  See, e.g., Robert E. 
McKenzie, Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Taxation, Statement at the IRS Oversight Board 
Oei FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  3/12/2012 2:41 PM 
2012] Getting More By Asking Less 1107 
 
5.  2003 Introduction of User Fee Requirements 
In 2003, final Treasury Regulations introduced a $150 user fee re-
quirement for submission of certain OICs.163  Those regulations, still in 
force, provide that no user fees are charged for offers based solely on 
doubt as to liability, and the fee is also waived for offers made by low-
income taxpayers.164  For offers accepted on effective tax administra-
tion grounds or on grounds of doubt as to collectibility where collecting 
a greater amount than that offered would create economic hardship, 
the user fee is generally applied against the amount of the offer.165  
However, if the taxpayer specifically requests reimbursement, the fee 
will be refunded.166  The user fee is otherwise nonrefundable once the 
OIC has been accepted for processing.167  
6.  2005–2006 Legislative Changes 
The most recent set of major statutory changes was made by the 
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (TIPRA)168 
and the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006.169  As a result of 
TIPRA, a partial payment of the proposed offer must now accompany 
 
Hearing ( Jan. 27, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.treasury.gov/irsob/ 
meetings/1-27-03/abast.pdf) (“This strict ‘gatekeeper’ approach is not consistent with 
recent congressional efforts to liberalize the OIC program and to encourage reasona-
ble collection alternatives.”); see also 2004 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 314 
(noting that because a larger number of offers were being returned to the taxpayer as 
“not processable,” the “IRS has been evaluating the substance of fewer offers since cen-
tralized OIC processing was adopted”).  The Taxpayer Advocate has also questioned the 
effectiveness and impacts of centralized processing.  See 2009 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 51, at 196, 201 (reporting that “OIC centralization has created a ‘bottle-
neck’” because the “IRS placed more emphasis on ‘moving’ the workload” than “resolv-
ing collection cases”); 2008 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 106, at 264 (identifying 
the impacts of centralization as one of the twenty most serious problems facing taxpay-
ers); see also Letter from Robert A. Zarzar, Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, to 
Dale Hart, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv., Small Bus./Self-Employed Div. (Oct. 14, 
2003), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 16, 2003, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT 200-38 
(expressing concern that “IRS employees at the [centralized OIC] sites might be reduc-
ing OIC inventory levels based on implementation of rigid procedures; tight rules  
regarding what constitutes a ‘processable’ offer and short time frames for submitting 
updated or missing documents”). 
163 Treas. Reg. § 300.3(b)(1) (2004). 
164 Id. § 300.3(b)(1)(i)–(ii). 
165 Id. § 300.3(b)(2). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. § 300.3(b)(3). 
168 Pub. L. No. 109-222, § 509, 120 Stat. 345, 362-64 (2006). 
169 Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. A, § 407, 120 Stat. 2922, 2960-62. 
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any OIC that is submitted.170  For lump-sum offers, a payment equal to 
twenty percent of the amount of the offer must accompany the submis-
sion.171  For periodic payment offers, a payment in the amount of the 
first proposed installment must accompany the submission.172  Under 
TIPRA, a periodic payment or lump-sum OIC that is not accompanied 
by the required partial payment “may be returned to the taxpayer as 
unprocessable.”173  After TIPRA was enacted, however, the IRS adopted 
procedures to allow continued processing of lump-sum offers in cases 
where less than the full amount of the partial payment required was 
included in the submission.174  An insufficient periodic payment will 
still cause the offer to be unprocessable.175  Furthermore, for periodic 
payment offers, the taxpayer must also continue to make installment 
payments due under the offer while the offer is pending, and failure to 
do so is regarded by the IRS as a withdrawal of the offer.176  Advance 
partial payments made by an OIC applicant will not be refunded by 
the IRS if the OIC is rejected.177  
The IRS also announced in 2006 that it would waive the partial 
payment requirements for offers submitted by low-income taxpayers 
and for offers based solely on doubt as to liability.178  Nonetheless, there 
was a subsequent disproportionate decline in the number of offers 
submitted by taxpayers below the poverty line.179  Finally, as a result of 
 
170 I.R.C. § 7122(c) (2006). 
171 Id. § 7122(c)(1)(A)(i).  A “‘lump-sum offer-in-compromise’ means any offer of 
payments made in 5 or fewer installments.”  Id. § 7122(c)(1)(A)(ii).   
172 Id. § 7122(c)(1)(B)(i). 
173 Id. § 7122(d)(3)(C). 
174 See IRM 5.8.2.4.1(1) (Mar. 26, 2010) (identifying criteria that will cause an offer 
to be returned as not processable and expressly excepting insufficient lump-sum pay-
ments); id. at 5.8.2.8(4) (stating that insufficient initial lump-sum payments will be 
considered a perfection issue and may still be processed). 
175 Id. 5.8.2.8(5). 
176 I.R.C. § 7122(c)(1)(B)(ii). 
177 See I.R.S. Notice 2006-68 §§ 1.02–.03, 2006-2 C.B. 105 (explaining that partial 
payments and installment payments on OICs will be considered payments of tax and 
not refundable deposits); I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-106 ( July 11, 2006) (“All install-
ment payments are nonrefundable.”); I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2006-22 ( July 2006) (stating 
that advance partial payments are considered “payments on tax” rather than refunda-
ble deposits (citing I.R.C. § 7809(b); Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1(h) (2002)).   
178 I.R.S. Notice 2006-68 § 4.02–.03, 2006-2 C.B. 105, 106.  A “low-income taxpayer” 
is defined as “an individual whose income falls at or below poverty levels based on 
guidelines established by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under 
the authority of section 673(2) of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, or another 
measure that is adopted by the Secretary.”  Id. § 4.02 (citation omitted) (citing Pub. L. 
No. 97-35, § 673(2), 95 Stat. 357, 511-12). 
179 See infra subsection II.B.2. 
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the TIPRA changes, the IRS now has twenty-four months to consider 
an offer and after that time the offer will be deemed accepted.180 
Also in 2006, Congress in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 
2006 amended I.R.C. § 6702 to impose a $5000 penalty for “specified 
frivolous submissions,” including submission of a frivolous Offer in 
Compromise.181  That same Act authorized the IRS to disregard any 
portion of an OIC application that is frivolous and to treat it as if it 
were never submitted.182 
B.  Two Problematic Trends in Historical Context 
The OIC procedure has seen significant changes over the past 
twenty years.  Several of these changes were implemented or enacted 
in response to real or perceived program flaws and shortcomings.  
Against this historical backdrop of changes, two problematic trends 
have emerged:  (1) an increase in the case inventory backlog and pro-
cessing times; and (2) a decline in the number of offers received and 
offers accepted, and an increase in offers returned to taxpayers.  Most 
of the commentary and criticism that has been levied against the OIC 
procedure over the years stems from discontent regarding one or both 
of these troubling trends. 
1.  1997–2001:  Increased Inventory Backlog  
and Longer Processing Times 
Between 1997 and 2001, the IRS’s OIC program was clearly suffer-
ing from a growing inventory backlog and longer processing times.183  
 
180 Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, 
§ 509, 120 Stat. 345, 362-63 (2006) (codified at I.R.C. § 7122(f) (first of two subsections 
(f))). 
181 Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. A, § 407(a), 120 Stat. 2922, 2960-61 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 6702(b)). 
182 Id. § 407(d), 120 Stat. at 2962 (codified at I.R.C. § 7122(f) (second of two sub-
sections (f))).  A submission is frivolous if the Secretary of the Treasury identifies it as 
frivolous or if any portion of the submission “reflects a desire to delay or impede the 
administration of Federal tax laws.”  I.R.C. § 6702(b)(2)(A).  These new rules regarding 
frivolous offers apply to “submissions made and issues raised after the date on which 
the Secretary first prescribe[d] a list” of frivolous claims, as required under the new 
section 6702(c).  Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, § 407(f), 120 Stat. at 2962.  
The IRS first issued such a list in 2007.  I.R.S. Notice 2007-30, 2007-14 C.B. 883.  The list 
was revised in 2008 and 2010.  I.R.S. Notice 2008-14, 2008-1 C.B. 310; I.R.S. Notice 
2010-33, 2010-17 I.R.B. 609. 
183 See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Offers in Compromise Program Log jammed, IRS Official  
Says, 89 TAX NOTES 856, 856 (2000) (“The IRS is having problems working all the  
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In a 2002 study, the GAO found that from 1997 to 2001, the percent-
age of OICs resolved in fewer than six months had fallen from sixty-
four percent to thirty-two percent, while the percentage of OICs closed 
between six and twelve months rose from twenty-nine percent to forty-
three percent.184  More problematically, the percentage of OICs that 
took at least a year to close more than tripled from seven percent to 
twenty-five percent.185  In fiscal year 2000, it took the IRS an average of 
292 days to close an OIC case, and in fiscal year 2001, that figure rose 
to 312 days.186  Furthermore, the year-end inventory—that is, the back-
log of cases—had risen from 32,279 in 1997 to 94,931 by 2001.187 
In the 2000 Annual Report to Congress, the Taxpayer Advocate 
noted these “unacceptable” processing times.188  While commending 
recent measures taken by IRS staff to improve the program, the Tax-
payer Advocate still found that “time frames for acknowledging and 
processing offers remain[ed] at an unacceptable level of service.”189  In 
her 2001 Annual Report to Congress, the Taxpayer Advocate again 
cited the large backlog and delays in deciding offers as one of the most 
serious problems faced by taxpayers.190 
Commentators provided various explanations and solutions for the 
backlog and processing time problems.  The GAO concluded in its 2002 
study that these problems were largely due to changes in the OIC pro-
gram caused by the 1998 Restructuring Act and IRS actions.191  Accord-
 
offers. . . . There are simply not enough trained people in the offers in compromise 
program . . . .”). 
184 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 10.  The GAO conducted its review of the 
IRS’s administration of the OIC program at the request of Senators Max Baucus and 
Charles Grassley, in large part in order to investigate concerns about a “growing back-
log of cases and longer processing times.”  Id. at 1. 
185 Id. at 10.    
186 Id. at 11. 
187 Id. at 10. 
188 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FY 2000 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 36 (2000); see 
also id. at 36-39 (discussing the Taxpayer Advocate’s concerns and the IRS’s initiatives 
designed to address the problem). 
189 Id. at 39. 
190 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, FY 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 52 (2001) 
[hereinafter 2001 NTA ANNUAL REPORT].  Indeed, in every year between 2001 and 
2010, the Taxpayer Advocate directly or indirectly listed problems with the OIC program 
in her list of the most serious problems confronting taxpayers.  See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 311 & n.1 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 
NTA ANNUAL REPORT]. 
191 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 12-15.  The 2002 GAO Report sought to 
determine (1) the cause of the increased backlog and processing times, (2) the viability 
of any IRS initiatives to reduce the backlog and processing times, (3) whether the IRS 
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ing to the report, these changes led to an increased demand for OICs, 
more processing steps, and an increase in the number of staff hours 
required to process an offer—all of which outpaced staffing increases 
to the OIC program.192  This increased demand was driven in part by 
the 1998 Restructuring Act requirement that the IRS inform taxpayers 
about the OIC program, and in part by practitioners’ increased publi-
cization of OICs.193  Adding to the burden, in 1999 the IRS began pro-
cessing incomplete applications while working to obtain the necessary 
missing information, instead of returning them.194  Furthermore, as a 
result of the 1998 Restructuring Act, the IRS expanded the base of tax-
payers eligible for offers in compromise by adding the current “effective 
tax administration” category and offering a new long-term deferred 
payment option that increased the affordability of OICs.195  The GAO 
also noted that, according to IRS officials, the Restructuring Act in-
creased workload and added steps to the OIC process by mandating 
independent administrative review of proposed rejections, and by re-
quiring taxpayers to resubmit applications that had originally been 
made using what had become nonconforming contract forms.196  Finally, 
the 2002 GAO Report found that the elimination of partial payment 
installment agreements in 1998 had caused more people struggling to 
pay their taxes to turn to the OIC program for relief.197  All of these 
changes led to more OIC requests and a resulting increase in the need 
for staff; the IRS could not keep pace in the face of such increased 
demand.198   
 
was fulfilling the Restructuring Act’s mandate to provide independent review of all 
proposed OIC rejections, and (4) the impact on taxpayers of a 1998 IRS counsel’s deci-
sion that the Service lacked legal authority to enter into partial payment installment 
agreements.  Id. at 1. 
192 Id. at 12-18. 
193 Id. at 13; see also Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax 
Compliance and Tax Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1039-42 (2003) (describing 
how “new demands” imposed by the 1998 Restructuring Act, including OIC program 
“liberalization,” led to an IRS “resource squeeze”). 
194 See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 14.    
195 Id.    
196 Id. at 15.   
197 Id. at 14.  In 1998, IRS counsel had determined that the IRS lacked legal author-
ity to enter into certain partial payment installment agreements.  Id.   In 2004, Congress 
reversed this decision by amending I.R.C. § 6159(a), which authorized the IRS to enter 
into partial payment installment agreements.  See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 843(a)(1), 118 Stat. 1418, 1600 (codified at I.R.C. § 6159(a) 
(2006)). 
198 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 15-18. 
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The Taxpayer Advocate attributed the increase in inventory (and 
thus the backlog) to (1) IRS service improvements and changes to the 
criteria for a “processable” offer, (2) the fact that taxpayers unable to 
pay in full could no longer enter into partial payment installment 
agreements and had to submit “deferred payment offers,” (3) a lack of 
agreement or understanding regarding the purposes of the OIC pro-
gram, and (4) the expansion of the program by the 1998 Restructur-
ing Act.199  The Taxpayer Advocate noted that the great increase in the 
number of offer applications submitted in the years leading up to 2001 
had caused the delays and backlog despite IRS efforts to improve the 
program, which had included committing additional resources.200  And 
further, the backlog itself created additional work, because “[b]y the 
time an OIC specialist receives an offer, the information may be out-
dated.”201  
In response to the backlog and processing time problems, the IRS 
introduced centralized processing of offers and imposed user fees and 
frivolity penalties.202  At the time, it was unclear whether these measures 
would be effective.  Subsequent developments revealed that the effects 
of these initiatives—both good and bad—were profound.203 
2.  2000–2009:  Decline in the Number of Received and  
Accepted Offers and Increase in “Repeat Offers” 
Another problematic trend has been a decline in both the number 
of submitted and accepted offers between 2000 and 2009.  From 2000 to 
2005, the number of submitted offers declined from 109,818 to 73,301, 
while the number of accepted offers declined from 31,609 to 14,526.204  
This decline of offers received and accepted continued through 
2008.205  On the other hand, between 2000 and 2005, repeat offers in-
 
199 2001 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 190, at 52, 54. 
200 Id. at 52-54. 
201 Id. at 53. 
202 See supra subsections II.A.4-6.  
203 See infra Section III.B. 
204 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 12 tbl.1.  While there was an increase in offers 
received between 2000 and 2003, offers received fell in 2004 and 2005.  Likewise, there 
was an increase in offers accepted in 2001 but acceptances declined thereafter from 
2002 to 2005.  Id.    
205 See 2010 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 190, at 313 (noting that “the program . . . 
experienced a steady decline in offers received and accepted since FY 2001 with a slight 
improvement in FY 2010”).  In the fourth quarter of 2010, centralized OIC locations 
“accepted 87 percent more offers than in the same period of FY 2009, and the dollars 
accepted in these offers increased by 64 percent.”  Id. at 316.  The Taxpayer Advocate 
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creased from 15% to 40% (reaching 44% in 2004), and 2005 data 
showed that many of these were multiple repeats.206  The percentage of 
offers returned to taxpayers as “not processable” or after acceptance 
for processing increased from 39% in 2001 to 57% in 2004.207 
Various commentators have attempted to explain the decline in 
submitted and accepted offers and the increase in the percentage of 
repeat offers and offer returns.  In seeking to explain the increased 
percentage of repeat offers, the GAO suggested that this change could 
be the result of taxpayer confusion or collection delay tactics.208  How-
ever, it also acknowledged that the IRS’s attempts to close cases quickly 
and to reduce case inventory could be responsible for creating a situa-
tion where taxpayers are unable to fully negotiate their offers before 
they are closed and thus submit repeat offers.209  With respect to the 
decline in submissions and acceptances in the program, the GAO 
questioned whether a decrease in program accessibility was the 
cause.210  The GAO noted that the Taxpayer Advocate, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the National Association of 
Enrolled Agents, and practitioners and practitioner organizations had 
cited confusion about program requirements, lengthy processing 
times, difficulty in getting reasonable offers accepted, and the burden-
someness of the program as barriers to accessibility.211  However, the 
GAO conceded that reduced program participation could have  
 
attributed the 2010 uptick to new procedures introduced by the IRS to “streamline” the 
centralized OIC process and found the increase “very encouraging.”  Id. at 315-16. 
206 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 12-14.  “Repeat offers occur when a taxpayer 
submits an offer that [the] IRS does not accept, [the] IRS closes the case, and then the 
taxpayer submits another offer covering at least some of the same tax liability.”  Id. at 12.  
207 2004 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 314. 
208 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 14. 
209 Id.  The GAO noted that the IRS itself had not investigated the reasons for the 
increased proportion of repeat offers.  Id. 
210 Id. at 20-23.  The GAO defines “accessibility” as “how easy it is for potentially eli-
gible taxpayers to participate in the OIC Program.”  Id. at 20. 
211 Id. at 20-21.  In addition, the GAO report criticized the IRS’s use of offers based 
on “effective tax administration” grounds.  Id. at 33-35.  While the GAO conceded that 
Congress’s intent in regard to ETA offers was not clear, the GAO did fault the IRS  
for implementing standards that rendered hardship ETA offers and doubt-as-to-
collectibility offers “effectively indistinguishable from each other.”  Id. at 33-37.  In-
deed, the report pointed out that the new ETA category may have created confusion.  
Id. at 37-38.  The GAO also investigated “offer mills”—practitioners who “consistently 
use[] negligent or deceptive practices to exploit taxpayers or the OIC Program”—but 
concluded that the impact of offer mills on OIC processing was negligible.  Id. at 28-31. 
Finally, the GAO concluded that appeals were being afforded as Congress intended.  
Id. at 31-32. 
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occurred for reasons other than barriers to accessibility and noted that 
the IRS had neither analyzed whether the accessibility of the OIC pro-
gram had changed, nor compared the declining numbers against the 
changes in the pool of “potentially eligible taxpayers.”212  The GAO 
concluded that the IRS did not know whether reduced accessibility led 
to the declining participation, and, moreover, whether the concerns 
raised by the Taxpayer Advocate and others were correct.213 
The Taxpayer Advocate has also pointed to possible reasons for 
this trend and has discussed this trend almost every year in the Annual 
Report to Congress.  For example, the 2004 Report cited the IRS’s 
adoption of “inflexible policies and automated processes” designed to 
manage OIC inventory as being responsible for the increase in OIC 
returns and rejections.214  Further, the number of offers being “sub-
stantively” evaluated by the IRS had decreased since the adoption of 
centralized OIC processing.215  The Taxpayer Advocate also complained 
that IRS data on OIC dispositions did not indicate whether centralized 
processing was “actually more efficient at substantive OIC processing” 
or whether centralization was just better at “quickly returning” OICs.216  
The Taxpayer Advocate also cited the $150 user fee, the IRS’s refusal 
to process OICs from taxpayers undergoing bankruptcy proceedings, 
the IRS’s rigid and unrealistic expectations in processing and evaluat-
ing submitted offers, and the IRS’s policy of rejecting offers where 
taxpayers appeared likely to qualify for long-term installment agree-
ments as contributing to high numbers of returns.217  Expressing con-
cern about these trends, the 2006 NTA Annual Report noted that, based 
on focus group studies, “external stakeholders” (i.e., practitioners) 
agreed that the OIC was “no longer a viable collection alternative” and 
“felt that the IRS’s first task was to find a reason—any reason—to  
reject the offer.”218   
 
212 Id. at 22-23. 
213 Id. at 23. 
214 2004 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 313.  The Report also mentioned 
OIC processing centralization, reduction in the number of attempts the Small Business/ 
Self-Employed Division would make to obtain information from taxpayers (“from ‘at 
least two’ to one”), and imposition of a user fee for OIC submissions as contributors to 
the problem.  Id. at 313-14. 
215 Id. at 315. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 319-24. 
218 2006 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 91.  These focus group participants 
“agreed that offers [were] not receiving fair consideration.”  Id. 
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The Taxpayer Advocate voiced concern that TIPRA’s new partial 
payment requirements, coupled with the nonappealability of returned 
offers, had led to a decline in viable offers being submitted.219  In 2007, 
the Taxpayer Advocate reiterated some of her 2006 comments, opining 
that new rules (including the 2003 introduction of the $150 user fee 
requirement and the TIPRA partial payment requirement), the high 
rate of returned OICs, and the lack of an avenue for appeal of such 
returns had together made it more difficult and expensive for taxpay-
ers to submit OICs.220  Finally, in 2009, the Taxpayer Advocate again 
voiced these concerns, citing the “daunting” application process, cen-
tralized processing, the IRS’s internal attitudes, new legislation making 
submission of an offer more expensive, and negative public perception 
as the causes of the program’s decline.221  
In addition to the Government Accountability Office and the Na-
tional Taxpayer Advocate, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration (TIGTA) has studied the causes of declining program 
participation.222  In a March 2010 evaluation report, TIGTA, like the 
 
219 Id. at 507-19.  The Taxpayer Advocate thus recommended elimination of the 
2005 TIPRA partial payment requirement, institution of an appeals procedure for re-
turned offers, and expansion of exceptions to the partial payment requirements.  Id. at 
508-09, 518-19. 
220 2007 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 376-81.  The report also noted that 
the fee waiver for low-income applicants had been ineffective, as evidenced by the fact 
that submissions from low-income taxpayers had fallen even more than for other tax-
payers after imposition of the user fee.  Id. at 377. 
221 2009 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 199-204.  In the 2008 Annual Report, 
the NTA also listed “[t]he [i]mpact of IRS [c]entralization on [t]ax [a]dministration” as 
one of the top twenty problems and listed centralization of the OIC program as “an 
example of a flawed centralization initiative.”  2008 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
106, at 260, 264.  In 2009, the Taxpayer Advocate recommended changes to improve 
the program and better effectuate congressional intent, including reinstatement of 
1992 Internal Revenue Manual provisions, reinstatement of “one-stop” customer service, 
better determinations of “reasonable collection potential,” and use of enforcement 
actions against “unskilled and unscrupulous” OIC preparers.  2009 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 51, at 204-07. 
222 TIGTA provides independent oversight of the IRS.  Information About the Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration, TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/about/tigta_brochure.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).  
TIGTA conducts audits of various tax administration matters and recommends reforms 
and improvements.  See Audit Reports, TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/oa_auditreports.shtml (last visited Jan. 15, 2012); Office 
of Audits (OA), TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., http://www.treasury.gov/ 
tigta/oa.shtml (last visited Jan. 15, 2012).  Various aspects of the IRS’s administration of 
the OIC program are among the items TIGTA studies.  TIGTA’s reports evince agree-
ment with some, though not all, of the problems and criticisms identified by the Tax-
payer Advocate and the Government Accountability Office.   
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Taxpayer Advocate, pointed to the implementation of the $150 user 
fee as a possible cause of the decline in OICs.223  In addition, in a June 
2005 audit report, TIGTA found that the user fee reduced the volume 
of offers filed at all income levels.224  Despite an exemption from the 
user fee for poverty-level taxpayers, the decline was steeper for those 
taxpayers.225  
*      *      * 
In sum, there have been two negative trends in OIC program ad-
ministration in recent years:  (1) in the period between roughly 1997 
and 2001, an inventory backlog and processing time problem devel-
oped, and (2) between 2000 and 2008, there were declining submis-
sions and acceptances as well as an increase in the proportion of 
repeat offers and offers returned to taxpayers.  Chronologically speak-
ing, these trends roughly correlate with (1) the 1998 Restructuring Act 
and (2) the changes to the procedure adopted between 1998 and 
2006, respectively.  These trends have elicited a number of different 
critiques of the OIC procedure,226 although critics disagree about the 
 
223 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2010-IE-R002, 
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 WAS SUB-
STANTIALLY IMPLEMENTED BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 39-40 (2010) (noting that in the 
first two years after the user fee was implemented OIC receipts declined from 127,769 
to 74,311). 
224 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE. NO. 2005-30-096, 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OFFER IN COMPROMISE APPLICATION FEE REDUCED THE 
VOLUME OF OFFERS FILED BY TAXPAYERS AT ALL INCOME LEVELS 2-3 (2005) [hereinafter 
TIGTA JUNE 2005 FINAL AUDIT REPORT] (reporting an overall decline of 28%).  
225 See id. at 3 (reporting that filings by taxpayers below the poverty level declined 
by 36% while filings by those above the poverty level declined by only 26%).  This de-
cline occurred in spite of the IRS’s early 2004 media campaign that alerted taxpayers 
about the exemption for poverty-level taxpayers.  Id. at 4. 
226 For example, the Taxpayer Advocate has repeatedly identified problems sur-
rounding the OIC program in its list of the most serious problems affecting taxpayers.  
See supra note 190.  TIGTA has generally been more positive than the Taxpayer Advo-
cate, though it did find room for improvement in the centralized processing system.  
See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 159 (acknowledging pro-
gress and making additional recommendations to facilitate processing); see also TREAS-
URY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2004-30-043, MONITORING OF 
ACCEPTED OFFERS IN COMPROMISE IS GENERALLY EFFECTIVE BUT SOME IMPROVEMENT IS 
NEEDED 8-10 (2004) (noting the lack of an organized method for handling new OICs); 
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REFERENCE NO. 2005-30-013, IMPROVE-
MENTS ARE NEEDED IN THE TIMELINESS AND ACCURACY OF OFFERS IN COMPROMISE PRO-
CESSED BY FIELD OFFER GROUPS 5-10 (2004) (criticizing the time it takes to process 
certain complex OICs).   
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source of the problem and the appropriate response.  In the next two 
Parts, I present a unifying framework for understanding and evaluat-
ing these problematic trends in the OIC procedure.  Based on an 
analysis of stakeholder interests and behaviors, I argue that reforms 
should be adopted that take into account the roles played by divergent 
interests and power dispersal in determining program outcomes. 
III.  EXPLAINING WEAKNESS:  A STAKEHOLDER DYNAMICS ANALYSIS  
The power to affect the OIC procedure’s effectiveness is dispersed 
among four players:  (1) Congress, (2) the IRS, (3) the taxpayer, and 
(4) financial supporters of the taxpayer.  Each of these players is capable 
of derailing the procedure through action or inaction and each has 
divergent and sometimes contradictory interests in how tax-debt relief 
in general, and the OIC procedure in particular, should operate.  
Moreover, the actions of any one of these players can have feedback 
effects on the interests and actions of other players.  In this way, the 
divergent interests and behavioral responses of these stakeholders 
combine to weaken the procedure over time.  Thus, the single most 
important factor in determining whether to adopt a reform is whether 
it exacerbates or ameliorates the downward-spiraling effects of these 
stakeholder interactions.  In this Part, I briefly summarize the different 
roles and interests of these four players.  I then describe concretely 
how the divergent interests and behaviors of these players have led to 
suboptimal outcomes over time, as evidenced by the trends discussed 
in Section II.B.   
A.  Four Stakeholders with Divergent Interests 
1.  Congress and Other Legislative Actors 
Congress has the power to define the content and shape of federal 
tax legislation.  But, of course, tax legislation is not created in a vacuum.  
Rather, other participants in the legislative process play important 
roles in shaping federal tax legislation.227  Such participants include 
 
227 See generally 4A BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF 
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶¶ 116.1–.3 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2011) (describing the 
legislative process for tax law, emphasizing that the President, the Treasury Depart-
ment, and others influence the House of Representatives, and noting that the House 
uses a wide array of specialists, including accountants, econometricians, and tax attor-
neys, in shaping new legislation).  
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committees, lobbyists, and aides.  These legislative players, mediated 
by congressional action, have the power to suggest, enact, amend, and 
abolish tax legislation.228  The interactions between Congress and the 
other participants in the tax legislative process are well illustrated in 
the hearings and testimony leading up to the enactment of the 1998 
Restructuring Act.229 
Congressional priorities change over time.  The motivations under-
lying the 2003–2006 statutory changes were far different from those 
underlying the 1998 changes.  The 1998 changes were aimed at curbing 
excesses in the IRS’s collection function230 and broadening the applica-
tion of the OIC program,231 while the 2003–2006 changes showed  
concern about managing the problems of an overburdened IRS.232  
Furthermore, the composition and activities of interest groups and 
other legislative participants that influence Congress are not static.  It 
is beyond the scope of this Article to survey the vast literature on how 
Congress behaves, including literature on capture, principal-agent 
problems, and interest-group theory.  The point here is merely that 
Congress is the source of the legislation that established the OIC proce-
dure.  However, its implementation in practice depends on the actions 
of other players, so congressional mandate is not determinative of 
program outcomes.  
 
228 How such stakeholders, interest groups, and other legislative actors interact to 
produce outcomes is, of course, the subject of extensive theoretical literature.  See, e.g., 
William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
171, 207-09 (2000) (discussing actors in the legislative process and their roles in craft-
ing new legislation). 
229 The hearings included testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance from 
the IRS Commissioner, the President of the National Society of Accountants, several tax 
attorneys, and a director of the General Accounting Office, among others.  See IRS Re-
structuring Hearings, supra note 129, at 20-49, 59-104, 106-30. 
230 See WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR. & WILLIAM H. NIXON, THE POWER TO DESTROY 217-29 
(1999) (arguing that the 1998 changes came in response to a new “awareness that all 
was not well inside an organization whose congressionally granted power allowed it to 
invade the lives of ordinary Americans”). 
231 See 2004 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 159, at 312 (noting that the “intended 
effect” of the 1998 Act’s expansion of the bases for compromise to include “effective 
tax administration” offers was “generally to increase the IRS’ flexibility in accepting 
OICs” (citing Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685; H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 288-89 (1998) (Conf. Rep.))).   
232 See supra subsections II.A.5-6. 
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2.  The IRS 
While the power to enact legislation lies with Congress, the power 
to administer the OIC statute is vested in the IRS.  The IRS is respon-
sible for promulgating the regulations and the rulings that interpret 
and implement the relevant statutes, designing the OIC Form (Form 
656), and handling logistical issues related to OIC filings (such as de-
ciding whether processing should be centralized and what kinds of 
employees should process filings).233   
The actions and decisions of the IRS in implementing the proce-
dure are an important reason why the intentions of Congress, as ex-
pressed in the statute, have not always had the anticipated results.234  
Practitioners and others have complained that the IRS’s actions have 
not always reflected an interest in increased taxpayer access to or 
greater functionality of the procedure.235  This may be due to a num-
ber of reasons.  Given that the IRS’s central job is the collection of 
revenue and enforcement of the tax laws, it may not be well suited to 
the administration of a tax compromise procedure.236  It may be too 
much to ask for an agency like the IRS to change its enforcement cul-
ture overnight, even in the face of a major piece of legislation such as 
the 1998 Restructuring Act.  This point is not new:  the perils of ex-
panding the job of the IRS beyond its fundamental collection mission 
have also been raised in the context of the agency’s expanding role in 
administering social programs.237  
 
233 See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 159, at 2 (dis-
cussing IRS initiation of the centralized processing program for offers, including the 
roles of different types of employees).  
234 See infra Section III.B. 
235 See 2010 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 190, at 314 (noting practitioner con-
cerns that “IRS employees . . . see the practitioners as the enemy and will not work with 
them to get the offer accepted”); 2006 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 91.  The 
Taxpayer Advocate “has also encountered what practitioners have described . . . as  
‘another agenda’” on the part of the IRS, including (1) concern that an increase in the 
use of collection alternatives will harm voluntary compliance, (2) reluctance to appear 
to be an installment lending institution, and (3) desire to discourage abuse of the OIC 
procedure.  Id. at 99. 
236 See, e.g., IRS Restructuring Hearings, supra note 129, at 412 (statement of Bruce A. 
Strauss, Enrolled Agent) (stating that the IRS’s “attitude” in the years preceding the 
1998 Act was that it must “[p]rotect the government[’s] interest”). 
237 Commentators have raised this point when considering whether the IRS should 
be asked to administer the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); cf. Jeremiah Coder, The New IRS:  Expanding 
the Mission?, 128 TAX NOTES 576, 577-78 (2010) (noting the increase in the IRS’s “non-
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Other explanations for this tension are also possible.  For instance, 
Bryan Camp has described the 1998 Act as containing a “partial para-
digm shift” away from what has traditionally been an “inquisitorial” 
(i.e., information gathering) model of tax administration toward an 
“adversarial” model.238  As evidence of this move, Camp cited the crea-
tion of the IRS Oversight Board, TIGTA, the Office of the Taxpayer 
Advocate, and the Office of Appeals.239  If Camp’s framework is cor-
rect, it is possible that the move to an adversarial process in tax admin-
istration may be a reason why IRS employees have been less than fully 
supportive of the OIC procedure.  Alternatively, the IRS’s reluctance 
to accept offers may be caused by resource constraints which prevent it 
from engaging in taxpayer-service oriented activities to the extent 
Congress envisioned.240  The IRS may have even taken steps to counter-
act Congress’s excessive demands.241  This Article does not seek to pre-
sent a detailed organizational theory as to why the IRS’s interests have 
run counter to those of Congress, taxpayers, and their representatives.  
Suffice it to say that, as is further described in Section III.B, these di-
vergent interests have operated over time to compromise the effec-
tiveness of the OIC procedure. 
3.  The Taxpayer 
A third player with power to effectuate the OIC procedure is, ob-
viously, the taxpayer herself.  The ultimate power of the taxpayer as a 
stakeholder in the success of the OIC procedure stems from the pro-
 
tax responsibilities” and noting the Taxpayer Advocate’s recommendation that the IRS 
adopt an additional mission statement of being a benefits administrator, in addition to 
a tax collector); Nicholas Duarte, New Programs Strain IRS Resources, Budget, 130 TAX 
NOTES 63 (2011).  
238 Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process, supra note 1, at 3-4; see also 
Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 1, at 57-58 (“Adversary process is not an 
effective regulatory mechanism to check government abuses in the modern administra-
tive state.”). 
239 Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process, supra note 1, at 91-103. 
240 See 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at vi 
(2011) (explaining that “despite a huge expansion in the IRS’s workload, Congress has 
reduced the IRS’s funding in each of the last two years” and that “the imbalance be-
tween [the IRS’s] workload and its resources is becoming unmanageable”). 
241 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 193, at 1039-42 (arguing that the 1998 Restructur-
ing Act imposed significant new demands on IRS resources, including liberalization of 
the OIC procedure, and discussing steps taken by the IRS to deal with the resources 
problem); Lederman, supra note 1, at 982-85 (noting that the 1998 Act resulted in 
“substantial resources” being shifted from tax enforcement to taxpayer service activities, 
leading to a decline in IRS enforcement activity). 
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cedure’s voluntary nature and the fact that the taxpayer must initiate 
offers.  In order for an offer to be processed and approved, it must 
first be submitted by the taxpayer.  Although certain IRS initiatives 
have explored how to proactively identify those taxpayers most likely 
to benefit from the procedure,242 those initiatives have not changed the 
underlying structural reality—the taxpayer initiates the filing.  The 
taxpayer confronts the following decisions:  whether to file, when to 
file, how much to offer, and whether to make a lump-sum or a periodic 
payment offer.  Thus, the taxpayer’s power in the functioning of the 
OIC process may be characterized as “soft” or “reactive” in the sense 
that the taxpayer operates from a position of reactivity to the tax law, 
both on the book and in actual administration, in deciding whether 
and how to apply for tax compromise.   
The motivations of the taxpayer will generally be to minimize, or 
at least reduce, the dollar amount she has to pay.  However, this de-
ceptively simple statement obscures a more complicated calculus.  For 
example, the taxpayer must weigh the probability and benefits of the 
offer’s being successful against the potential consequences of provid-
ing the IRS with further information about the taxpayer’s assets and 
financial situation and ultimately having the offer rejected.  Thus, 
whether to make an offer involves a balancing of the chance of success 
against the odds of incurring follow-up IRS action.  In addition, since 
the introduction of the partial payment requirement, the taxpayer must 
also factor in the chance that, if the IRS rejects her offer, it may refuse 
to return the partial down payment she submitted with the offer.243  
The taxpayer will also have to consider how the submission and ac-
ceptance of an offer may impact her ability to pay her other debts, and 
whether an offer, even if accepted, is likely to be successful in light of 
these other obligations.  Finally, the taxpayer will likely weigh the ad-
vantages of a bankruptcy filing, which can take care of many debts at 
once, over the filing of a tax OIC, which can resolve only the tax debt.  
The decision will depend on the specifics of each taxpayer’s situation, 
including the amount and type of tax and other debts owed, the years 
 
242 For example, such an approach was recommended by TIGTA in 2006.  See TIGTA 
JULY 2006 FINAL AUDIT REPORT, supra note 53, at 18 (arguing that IRS management 
should first “[d]evelop a strategy to identify potential candidates for the OIC program 
and then determine how to get these taxpayers into the program”). 
243 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.  
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at issue, the availability of bankruptcy as an alternative, and whether 
the tax and other debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy.244 
4.  Other Stakeholders 
In addition to Congress, the IRS, and the taxpayer, the motivations 
and actions of those who facilitate the taxpayer’s offer have to be taken 
into account.  Such parties may include attorneys, tax advisors, and 
most importantly, those who help bankroll the taxpayer’s offer.  Often, 
the taxpayer’s ability to propose and complete an offer is dependent 
on the goodwill and financial assistance of family members, friends, or 
banks.245  This is particularly true after the introduction of the partial 
payment requirement.246  The introduction of the partial payment re-
quirement and the IRS’s policy of retaining this payment even if the 
offer is rejected have made it more difficult for taxpayers to obtain the 
means to fund proposed offers because financial supporters (both famil-
ial and institutional) may not be willing to provide the funds.247  Thus, 
the decisions of these third parties are likely to be critical in determin-
ing whether offers are proposed, accepted, and successfully completed. 
Unsurprisingly, while the interests of these bankrollers are gener-
ally in direct opposition to the interests of the IRS, they may not always 
be completely in alignment with the taxpayer’s interests either.  The 
presence and role of these stakeholders may therefore cause program 
reforms to have different consequences than what was intended.  In 
performing their calculus, these players may, for example, consider 
the likelihood of successful debtor rehabilitation and the other nontax 
debts of the debtor.  If the taxpayer’s financial backers determine that 
a proposed offer is likely to be rejected and the down payment forfeited, 
their unwillingness to extend funds will effectively chill the market for 
offers, independent of the actions of the taxpayer. 
 
244 For a fuller discussion of bankruptcy as an alternative for the distressed taxpayer, 
see Mather & Weisman, supra note 37, at A-53 to -80. 
245 See generally 2007 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 379 (discussing sources 
of funding for submitted offers). 
246 See 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 76-77 
(2007) (discussing the importance of third-party financial assistance for taxpayers seek-
ing to compromise). 
247 See id. at 77 (“The most common source of offer funds is family and friends.  It is 
unlikely that these third parties will provide funds for an offer since they are likely to 
forfeit 20 percent of the offered amount without compromising the liability for the 
taxpayer.”). 
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In sum, in reforming or improving the OIC procedure, the incen-
tives and motivations of third-party financers must be taken seriously.  
This is particularly so because one of the IRS’s key incentives to com-
promise with the taxpayer may well be the opportunity to tap into 
fresh funding sources to help pay delinquent tax debts.  The existence 
of third-party funding sources may explain why accepted offers gener-
ate more cents on the dollar than the IRS collects through its usual 
collections process or than it collects from rejected OICs.248  Third-
party financers are essential to the program’s effectiveness, and the 
incentives that dictate their behaviors should be carefully considered. 
B.  Power Dispersal and Interest Divergence in Action— 
Two Turning Points 
The interests of and interactions between these four stakeholders 
have had a significant impact on the OIC procedure’s recent history.  
This Section shows that recent negative trends in OIC program per-
formance are, at their core, a result of the divergent interests and dis-
persed power of the four stakeholders, which create unexpected and 
suboptimal outcomes. 
1.  1998 Restructuring Act Changes and IRS Responses 
Dispersed power and interests among stakeholders arguably un-
dermined the “on-the-ground” effectiveness of the 1998 Restructuring 
Act changes.  The 1998 Restructuring Act imposed new requirements 
on the IRS that were aimed at making the OIC program more accessible 
to taxpayers.249  These changes were Congress’s response to criticisms 
that the OIC program was not accessible to taxpayers.250   
Unfortunately, the divergent interests of the IRS and its responses 
to the 1998 legislative changes limited the effectiveness of those 
 
248 See supra subsection I.B.1. 
249 Among these changes were the introduction of the effective tax administration 
ground for offer acceptances, new requirements for independent administrative review 
before rejecting an offer, a requirement that a “facts and circumstances” analysis be 
conducted for each case, and a requirement that the IRS not reject an offer from a low-
income taxpayer solely based on the amount of the offer. See supra subsection II.A.3; 
see also Taxpayer Beware:  Schemes, Scams, and Cons:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 
107th Cong. 59 (2001) (statement of Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues, U.S. Gen. 
Accounting Office) (discussing the changes to the OIC procedure after the enactment 
of the 1998 Restructuring Act). 
250 See supra notes 146-49. 
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changes.  As previously discussed, the 1998 Restructuring Act led to an 
on-the-ground capacity issue, as manifested by an inventory backlog 
and increased processing times.251  In response, the IRS undertook its 
own independent initiatives to cope with the situation.252  Specifically, 
the IRS proposed two key initiatives:  (1) “centralized” processing, 
where complex and simple offers would be separated so as to maxim-
ize staff efficiency; and (2) “fast track” processing, where the simple 
offers in the current backlog would be sent to a special “fast track” to 
be sorted.253  The idea was that simpler cases required fewer formalities, 
and thus less staff time.254  The IRS expected this type of processing to 
stabilize its backlog and keep pace with its new cases.255  In addition, 
the IRS proposed several other measures.256   
As repeatedly noted by the National Taxpayer Advocate and other 
commentators, centralized processing may have reduced the number 
of accepted offers, thereby reducing rather than increasing taxpayer 
accessibility to the program.257  In her 2009 Annual Report to Con-
 
251 See supra subsection II.B.1.  The 1998 congressional changes led to greater offer 
demand, more processing steps, and an increased number of staff hours required to 
process an offer, all of which essentially outpaced IRS staffing increases.  2002 GAO 
REPORT, supra note 152, at 9-18. 
252 See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 18-26 (describing these initiatives). 
253 Id. at 19-23.    
254 Id. at 20.  Centralized processing in essence shifted offer processing responsibility 
away from higher-grade field personnel to lower-grade staff at two campuses.  Id. at 19. 
255 Id. at 20.   
256 For example, the IRS proposed overtime work for some employees at processing 
centers.  Id. at 24.  It suggested expanding the criteria for returning OICs to taxpayers 
to reduce time spent on offers that were not serious.  Id. at 24-25.  The IRS also sug-
gested using “quick hits” to consolidate multiple delinquencies into one series of in-
stallment payments.  Id. at 25.  Other measures to reduce backlog and wait time 
included penalizing frivolous offers and suspending the statutory period for collections 
while OICs are processed, thus minimizing the number of offers filed simply to delay 
collection until it was too late.  Id. at 26.  The IRS likewise proposed a change in the 
Internal Revenue Code to mandate counsel review of OICs only when the amount was 
greater than $250,000, instead of the current $50,000.  Id.  Finally, the IRS requested 
the assessment of a user fee for OICs, which was eventually implemented.  Id.   
257 See supra subsection II.B.2; see also 2009 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 
201 (“[O]ffer acceptances have declined each year since the inception of [centralized] 
OIC . . . .”).  The IRS disagreed, noting that while centralization began in 2001, new 
offers continued to increase until 2003; the IRS argued, therefore, that the subsequent 
decline in 2004 was not attributable to centralization but was a consequence of the new 
user fee.  2008 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 106, at 269.  The Taxpayer Advocate 
countered that the delayed decline may have been attributable to a time lag while tax-
payers adjusted their behavior and pointed out that OIC acceptances declined immedi-
ately after the IRS instituted centralized processing in 2002.  Id. at 272 n.32.  In its 2002 
report, the GAO expressed uncertainty as to whether these initiatives would reduce 
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gress, the Taxpayer Advocate noted that centralization essentially 
placed greater emphasis on “‘moving’ the workload” rather than actu-
ally resolving collections cases, and that OIC acceptances declined each 
year following centralization, demonstrating the “bottleneck” effect of 
such centralized processing.258 
IRS responses to the pressures created by the 1998 Restructuring 
Act—which included advocating for penalties for frivolous offers, pro-
posing imposition of a user fee, introducing a partial payment re-
quirement, and looking at potential suspension of the collection 
statute when an offer is submitted, all of which eventually were adopt-
ed259—also had the effect of chilling taxpayer participation in the OIC 
procedure.260  Instead of reducing only frivolous offers, such reforms in 
fact had the effect of reducing all offers.261  
In sum, despite Congress’s intention to make the OIC program 
more accessible, the divergent interests of the IRS and its power to make 
proposals and adopt procedures to effectuate those interests ultimately 
undermined the congressional intent behind the 1998 Act.  As further 
described below, the IRS’s actions in turn had an impact on the behav-
ior of taxpayers and their supporters—the two other stakeholders with 
the power to influence eventual program outcomes. 
2.  Taxpayer and Other Stakeholder Reactions to the Partial Payment 
Requirement, User Fees, and Frivolity Penalties 
The years 2003 to 2006 brought significant changes to the OIC stat-
ute.262  The IRS suggested many of these changes to Congress in re-
sponse to the inventory backlog and processing time problems created 
by the 1998 Restructuring Act.263  Among the changes was a require-
ment that taxpayers submit a partial payment with OIC proposals.264  
 
processing time and the backlog.  See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 18-19.  The 
GAO was ambivalent about the viability of these solutions largely because “[m]any of 
the [IRS’s] underlying assumptions have little empirical basis” and because the IRS had 
not completed its own evaluation of their effectiveness.  Id. at 18-19, 27-28. 
258 2009 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 201; see also supra subsection II.B.2. 
259 See 2002 GAO REPORT, supra note 152, at 24 tbl.4 (describing the expected re-
sults and implementation status of these initiatives). 
260 See infra subsection III.B.2.   
261 See infra subsection III.B.2. 
262 See supra subsections II.A.5-6. 
263 See supra subsections II.A.4 and III.B.1. 
264 See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.  However, partial payments are 
waived for low-income taxpayers and for OICs submitted based solely on doubts as to 
liability.  See supra note 178 and accompanying text.   
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Thus, under current law, some offers not accompanied by the re-
quired partial payment may be returned to the taxpayer as “unpro-
cessable.”265  In addition, the IRS can keep partial payments submitted 
by OIC applicants even if the OIC is rejected.266  In 2003, the IRS in-
troduced a $150 user fee requirement,267 a change it had previously 
proposed.268  Finally, in 2006, Congress amended the Internal Revenue 
Code to impose a $5000 penalty for “specified frivolous submission[s],” 
including submission of a “frivolous” offer.269 
By making these changes, the IRS and Congress hoped to manage 
inventory backlog and processing time problems by eliminating merit-
less offers.270  However, as a result of the reactions of taxpayers and 
their supporters, the 2003–2006 amendments instead had the effect of 
discouraging all taxpayers from submitting OICs.271  Nonrefundable 
partial payments, user fees, and frivolity penalties all raised the costs of 
filing an offer.  These changes, therefore, had a feedback effect not 
only on taxpayers, but also on their financial supporters, who, by 
providing financial and advisory support, exercised power over the 
timing and volume of offer submissions.  These stakeholders became 
less inclined to file or fund any offers, even those that had not become 
more costly as a result of the 2003–2006 changes.272  If the IRS intends 
 
265 I.R.C. § 7122(d)(3)(c) (2006); see also supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.   
266 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
267 Treas. Reg. § 300.3(b)(1) (2004); see also supra subsection II.A.5.  
268 User Fees for Processing Offers to Compromise, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,573, 67,574 
(Nov. 6, 2002). 
269 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. A, §§ 407(a), 
(d), 120 Stat. 2922, 2960-62 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 6702(b), 7122(f) (second 
of two subsections (f))).  Congress also added I.R.C. § 7122(f), which authorizes the IRS 
to disregard any frivolous portion of an OIC application and treat it as if it were never 
submitted.  Id. § 407(d) (codified at I.R.C. § 7122(f) (second of two subsections (f))). 
270 See TIGTA JUNE 2005 FINAL AUDIT REPORT, supra note 224, at 1-3 (discussing the 
intention behind and the results of the user fee); see also 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 
16, at 23 (discussing the user fee). 
271 See supra subsection II.B.2. 
272 See supra subsection III.A.4.  For example, TIGTA has noted that the decline in 
offers after the implementation of the user fee has been strongest among taxpayers 
below the poverty line, even though the user fee is waived for such taxpayers.  TIGTA 
JUNE 2005 FINAL AUDIT REPORT, supra note 224, at 3.  Part of the problem, as the Tax-
payer Advocate and other commentators have noted, is that taxpayers submitting OICs 
have not generally had the cash on hand to fund proposed offers and thus may have to 
borrow from friends, family, or banks.  See 2007 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 
379 (finding that for “about 70 percent of the offers accepted by the IRS before TIPRA 
was implemented, the 20 percent partial payment” was not paid from liquid assets held 
by the taxpayer); 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 246, at 81 tbl.2.3.1 (finding 
fifty-six percent of taxpayers borrowed from friends and family to satisfy OIC demands).  
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the OIC procedure to add value by drawing fresh sources of payment 
into tax coffers, then this side effect must be taken seriously.273 
While the intentions of the IRS in encouraging, and Congress in 
enacting, the 2003–2006 changes may have been to reduce both the 
number of frivolous offers and the waste of IRS resources, the adverse 
reactions of taxpayers and other stakeholders have reduced program 
viability.  These responses show that divergent interests and dispersed 
power among stakeholders can cause the effects of any tax reforms to 
be unpredictable, which can lead to unintended consequences. 
*      *      * 
Examining these two recent turning points demonstrates how 
countervailing responses to major OIC program changes can nullify 
the effectiveness of well-intentioned program changes.  Stakeholder 
reactions to the last two sets of major changes to the OIC program—
the IRS’s reactions to the 1998 Act and taxpayers’ and other stake-
holders’ reactions to the 2003–2006 changes—suggest that Congress 
and the IRS, when contemplating OIC reforms, must carefully consid-
er how stakeholder responses may render such reforms ineffective or 
even detrimental.  Part IV furthers this analysis by discussing the kinds 
of reforms Congress and the IRS should and should not adopt in light 
of this stakeholder dynamics framework. 
IV.  EVALUATING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM  
UNDER THE FRAMEWORK 
The power to effectuate the OIC procedure is dispersed among 
four different players with divergent and competing interests.274  The 
actions and reactions of each player can create counterproductive, 
downward-spiraling effects that may undermine the procedure’s effi-
cacy.  Under this analysis of stakeholder dynamics, if the IRS and Con-
 
The new partial payment requirement and the risk that any incomplete payment may 
not be refunded likely make financial backers, especially family and friends, less willing 
to lend to taxpayers negotiating OICs.  Id. at 77.  Banks might be unwilling to lend to 
taxpayers unless a forgiveness of some tax liability improves their chance of repayment; 
such banks would therefore be less willing to lend the funds for a partial payment 
where the funds may be retained if the offer is rejected.  In that scenario, the taxpayer 
would no longer have the money, the underlying tax debt would not be compromised, 
and the bank’s chances of being repaid would be low.   
273 See infra subsection IV.A.2. 
274 See supra Section III.A. 
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gress want to strengthen the OIC procedure, then they would need to 
centralize power among fewer stakeholders, eliminate program charac-
teristics that provoke unproductive interactions and negative feedback 
effects, or both.   
Centralizing power is difficult.  The OIC procedure goes to the 
heart of the debtor-creditor relationship between the taxpayer and the 
IRS.  This relationship is not entirely voluntary, but rather is imposed 
on the parties by structural features of the tax system.275  Further, inter-
fering with preexisting relationships between taxpayers and their finan-
cial backers, whether familial or arm’s length, would also not be easy.  
Disrupting familial dynamics would require changing the underlying 
social fabric, just as disrupting arm’s length lending relationships 
would involve fundamental changes to economic and financial norms.  
Finally, the tax legislative process constitutionally requires Congress as 
a participant, since the process ensures that proposals from the Treas-
ury, the IRS, and other sources appear before Congress.276  
Hence, rather than unrealistically trying to centralize power or 
eliminate stakeholders, reforms should instead focus on eliminating 
features of the procedure that are likely to provoke unproductive or 
destructive interactions among stakeholders with divergent interests.  
Proposals likely to provoke unproductive stakeholder dynamics should 
be rejected.  Instead, Congress and the IRS should adopt reforms that 
minimize divergent stakeholder reactions.  Although it may be difficult 
to predict in advance which reforms are likely to provoke unproduc-
tive stakeholder reactions, it will be possible in at least some cases.   
I now suggest two specific reforms that should be adopted because 
they are consistent with this proposed analytical framework.  I then 
provide one example of a proposed reform that should not be imple-
mented because of the destructive stakeholder interactions it would 
provoke.   
A.  Reforms That Might Work 
Here, I offer two concrete suggestions that should reduce the likeli-
hood of downward-spiraling interactions between stakeholders.  First, 
introducing more independence into the offer adjudication process 
 
275 See supra subsection I.B.3. 
276 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 227, ¶ 116.1 (noting the constitutional re-
quirement that “all Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representa-
tives” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1)). 
Oei FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  3/12/2012 2:41 PM 
2012] Getting More By Asking Less 1129 
 
can make it less adversarial and less likely to trigger strongly negative 
reactions.  Second, rethinking the rules governing the partial down 
payments that accompany failed offers—offers that are not accepted 
and offers that, though accepted, fail to be completed—can also miti-
gate counterproductive stakeholder reactions.  
1.  Creation of a Non-Stakeholder Initial  
Adjudicator of Offers 
Under current procedures, the IRS generally reviews “simple” offers 
for processability in their centralized offices in Brookhaven or Mem-
phis and then processes the offers.277  Various parties have criticized 
aspects of IRS processing for not adequately considering the interests 
of taxpayers.278  Real or perceived IRS unfairness in deciding whether 
to accept offers may make some taxpayers reluctant to submit offers, 
particularly since the partial payment is nonrefundable.279  Thus, the 
agenda of one stakeholder (the IRS) causes another (the taxpayer or 
the taxpayer’s financial backer) to behave differently by withdrawing 
participation.  However, injecting an element of impartiality into the 
processing of offers could mitigate this unproductive dynamic.  Impar-
tiality is valuable because it would promote more balanced considera-
tion of offers by the IRS, which would increase taxpayer confidence in 
receiving a fair evaluation of a submitted offer. 
Impartiality can be incorporated into the process in one of two  
related ways.  First, an independent third-party adjudicator could be 
responsible for accepting or rejecting offers.  The idea that having an 
independent adjudicator could improve interactions and results be-
tween the IRS and a taxpayer is not without precedent.  For example, 
two witnesses at congressional hearings for the 1998 Restructuring Act 
suggested providing for an independent (or at least a less enforcement-
 
277 See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. 
278 For example, the Taxpayer Advocate and practitioners have voiced concerns 
that the IRS fails to consider the individualized circumstances of taxpayers, including 
the needs of taxpayers in various geographical areas.  See, e.g., 2008 NTA ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 106, at 264 (noting that centralized processing employs a “cookie-cutter” 
approach “over an individualized, facts-and-circumstances approach” that limits the OIC 
program’s accessibility); McKenzie, supra note 162 (critiquing the IRS’s “strict ‘gate-
keeper’ approach,” and noting how IRS allowable-expense standards apply uniformly 
despite geographical variations in cost); see also Zarzar, supra note 162.  More broadly, 
taxpayers and their advocates have complained that the IRS has a hidden agenda be-
cause it is too invested in summarily (and unfairly) rejecting offers.  See supra note 235 
and accompanying text. 
279 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
Oei FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)3/12/2012 2:41 PM 
1130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1071 
 
minded) third-party adjudicator.280  In addition, the perceived merits 
of an independent voice in the collections process likely contributed 
to the creation of the Office of Appeals,281 to which rejections of pro-
posed offers are currently appealable.282  The most obvious objection 
to this reform is that it would likely increase the cost of program ad-
ministration.   
A second, less costly way to create more independence would be to 
endow the reviewing IRS officer with a new legal status akin to an om-
budsperson or trustee.  This status would require the reviewing officer 
to safeguard the rights of both the delinquent taxpayer and the IRS, to 
mediate the dispute, and to reach a fair determination of what com-
promise offer is acceptable.  Creating a trustee-type legal status also 
has precedent in federal bankruptcy law.  The “trustee in bankruptcy” 
in reorganization bankruptcies is one example of a legal status created 
 
280 See IRS Restructuring Hearings, supra note 129, at 94 (statement of Douglas C. 
Burnette, President, National Society of Accountants) (recommending that “the Fi-
nance Committee consider removing the offer-in-compromise program from collec-
tions and place it in a more suitable location within [the] IRS, such as appeals or an 
expanded and independent taxpayer advocate’s office”); id. at 377 (statement of Michael 
I. Saltzman, Attorney) (“A third party should be interposed in the offer in compromise 
process to help the taxpayer and the IRS collection officer work out an agree-
ment. . . . The third party should . . . have as his or her objective, the development of a 
practical and attainable plan to pay as much of the tax as possible. . . . [The third party] 
may come from a specialized group in the IRS’s Appeals Division, the Taxpayer’s Advo-
cate Problems Resolution function, or outside private practitioners . . . .”). 
281 See Joint Review of the Strategic Plans and Budget of the Internal Revenue Service, 2005:  
Hearing Before the J. Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong. 67-68 & n.32 (2005) (statement of 
Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate) (discussing the history of the IRS Appeals 
Office and noting that “to maintain the independent status of Appeals and preserve the 
principle of separating the Audit and Appeals operations, the Appeals function was 
carved out and placed under the office of the Assistant Regional Commissioner (Appel-
late)”); see also David M. Fogel, The Inside Scoop About the IRS’s Appeals Division, 99 TAX 
NOTES 1503 ( June 9, 2003) (“[T]o accomplish its mission, the Appeals function must 
be fair and free of conflict of interest.  This is done by separating Appeals Officers from 
compliance personnel (for example, Revenue Agent or Revenue Officer).”). 
282 See generally What Can You Expect from Appeals?, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/ 
individuals/article/0,,id=96765,00.html (last updated Feb. 27, 2009) (summarizing the 
appeal process and noting that the Appeals department is “independent of any other 
IRS office”); Independence of Appeals, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id= 
148490,00.html (last updated Oct. 20, 2010) (stressing the importance of the Appeals 
department’s independence).  But cf. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process, 
supra note 1, at 102-03 (noting that “the infliction of an ex parte rule on Appeals is a 
subtle step on the road to turning the Office of Appeals into an administrative law 
court”).   
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to safeguard the debtor’s rights while ensuring proper distribution to 
creditors.283 
To date, the IRS has made strides in implementing a fairer and 
more independent offer evaluation process.  One positive step, for 
example, is that an independent office reviews appeals of rejected  
offers.  Another reason for optimism is the pilot mediation-and-
arbitration program currently available in some cases following unsuc-
cessful attempts to reach a compromise.284  However, filing an offer, 
waiting for it to be rejected, and then appealing or applying for media-
tion is a lengthy process.  This system may discourage the initial filing 
of OICs by taxpayers who are suspicious of the IRS’s intentions with 
respect to OIC program administration.   
Creating an independent offer adjudicator, or at least an inde-
pendent legal status for offer adjudicators, would minimize the detri-
mental effects of divergent interests.  First, this reform reassures 
taxpayers that they would have a fair opportunity to get their initial 
offer accepted.  This perception of independence would likely improve 
the current dynamic that discourages certain taxpayers, who feel that 
they will lose their partial down payment if their offer is rejected, from 
making make meritorious offers or any offers at all.285  Creating an in-
dependent adjudicator or a position of similar legal status will also 
lessen counterproductive IRS responses of returning offers as nonpro-
cessable solely in order to reduce caseloads and processing times.286  
Therefore, for both the taxpayer and the IRS, having an independent 
 
283 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 307, 321–323, 1104 (2006) (establishing the status of trustee and 
outlining the position’s requirements, powers, and appointment procedure). 
284 Section § 7123(b) of the Internal Revenue Code instructed the IRS to establish a 
pilot program by which the taxpayer and the Office of Appeals can jointly request arbi-
tration for any factual issue left unresolved after an unsuccessful attempt to enter into 
an OIC.  See I.R.S. Announcement 2011-6, 2011-4 I.R.B. 433 (extending the two-year 
pilot mediation-and-arbitration program until December 31, 2012); see also Rev. Proc. 
2009-44, 2009-40 I.R.B. 462 (expanding the realm of cases eligible for mediation); 
I.R.S. Announcement 2008-111, 2008-48 I.R.B. 1224 (outlining the mediation and arbi-
tration procedures under § 7123); Rev. Proc. 2006-44, 2006-2 C.B. 800 (establishing 
the arbitration program within the Office of Appeals “to improve tax administration, 
provide customer service and reduce taxpayer burden”). 
285 See supra subsection II.B.2; see also supra notes 162, 235 and accompanying text 
(discussing practitioner concerns about IRS reforms that have limited the efficacy of the 
procedure). 
286 IRS initiatives aimed at shrinking the backlog through user fees, frivolity penal-
ties, and partial payment requirements have had the undesirable effect of discouraging 
even meritorious offers.  See supra subsection III.B.2. 
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adjudicator of offers should minimize the negative effects of divergent 
interests and instead produce more successful programs. 
2.  Rethinking Implementation of User Fees and the  
Partial Payment Requirement 
Reforming how the IRS treats partial payments and user fees for 
returned or rejected offers could also lessen the effects of interest-
divergent behaviors.  One of the unhelpful dynamics that has surfaced 
in the administration of the OIC procedure is that IRS and legislative 
initiatives to reduce backlog and frivolous offers (such as the imposed 
user fee, frivolity penalties, and the partial payment requirement) have 
led to a decline in both legitimate and frivolous offers, and have had a 
chilling effect, particularly on taxpayers below the poverty line.287  Most 
notably, the partial payment requirements for both lump-sum and in-
stallment OICs have discouraged taxpayers and their financial backers 
from submitting offers.288  The IRS generally will not return the user 
fee if it accepts a proposed offer for initial processing but subsequently 
returns it.289  Additionally, the IRS treats lump-sum or periodic partial 
payments as payments of tax and therefore as nonrefundable if the 
IRS returns or rejects the offer.290  
The partial payment requirement and user fee are not per se 
bad—such barriers to entry can ensure that taxpayers are more likely 
to follow through on the offers they make.  Furthermore, these barri-
ers may reduce moral hazard, and ultimately the costs of the program, 
by discouraging submission of unrealistic offers and discouraging bad 
behavior.291  In particular, to the extent that the OIC procedure’s suc-
cess depends on drawing in new money to pay off delinquent tax 
debts, requiring a partial down payment and a user fee may help to 
distinguish between those cases in which new funds are available and 
 
287 See supra subsection III.B.2; see also TIGTA JUNE 2005 FINAL AUDIT REPORT, supra 
note 224, at 1-3 (discussing the disproportionate decline in offer receipts from poverty-
level taxpayers). 
288 See supra notes 219-20 and subsection III.B.2. 
289 See supra subsection II.A.5. 
290 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
291 Cf. supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing similar practices in the in-
surance industry). 
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those cases in which they are not.  Therefore, the solution is not nec-
essarily to eliminate all fees and payments.292  
On the other hand, the current nonrefundability of fees and down 
payments goes a step too far.  While the down payment requirement 
may guard against unrealistic offers, nonrefundability creates a situa-
tion where the taxpayer (or her financial backers) effectively must 
gamble that her offer will be accepted.  The cost of betting wrong is 
the down payment and, in some cases, the user fee.  A taxpayer or her 
supporters might well conclude that it makes no sense to submit the 
offer (or, in the case of a financial backer, to lend or give the taxpayer 
funds), especially since the party reviewing the offer is the taxpayer’s 
creditor, who has an incentive to reject the offer and retain the down 
payment.293  The nonrefundability of partial payments also likely creates 
an incentive for the taxpayer to submit a “low ball” offer, since doing 
so will reduce the amount forfeited to the IRS if the offer is rejected or 
returned.294  Thus, nonrefundability may reduce potential revenues 
generated by the program.   
There are arguments in favor of continuing to impose user fees 
and down payment requirements in most cases,295 but partial payments 
should be refundable to the taxpayer in the case of a returned or re-
jected offer.  This will minimize the likelihood of taxpayers reacting to 
the partial payment and user fee by “refusing to play.”  To further en-
courage taxpayers and their backers to submit offers, the IRS could 
implement a system whereby partial payments are escrowed while the 
taxpayer’s submitted offer is pending.  The payment would then either 
be applied to the tax liability (if the offer is accepted) or returned to 
the taxpayer or third-party funder (if the offer is rejected).  Such an 
arrangement accords philosophically with a system that seeks to incen-
tivize good offers and to draw new money into the collection pool.  
 
292 Proposed legislation would have repealed the partial payment requirements im-
posed by TIPRA.  See Tax Compromise Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 2343, 111th Cong. 
§ 2 (2009).  However, the proposed legislation was never enacted. 
293 This is especially problematic given that a pre-TIPRA IRS study showed that for 
about seventy percent of OICs accepted before TIPRA, the partial payment amount 
would not have been available from the taxpayer’s liquid assets.  2007 NTA ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 51, at 379; see also 2 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 246, at 
81 tbl.2.3.1.  This finding underscores the importance of the taxpayer’s financial backers. 
294 The National Taxpayer Advocate has voiced this concern.  See 2007 NTA ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 51, at 379. 
295 The IRS should continue the current practice of relaxing user fee and down 
payment requirements in appropriate circumstances, such as in the case of low-income 
taxpayers. 
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Additionally, it would continue to weed out nonviable offers while mit-
igating the chilling effect of the current system.  Under the framework 
presented in this Article, the proposed system would continue to serve 
the interests of the tax collector without incentivizing taxpayers and 
their backers to react in ways that would jeopardize the effectiveness 
and relevance of the procedure. 
Critics of my proposed changes might argue that since any down 
payment ultimately constitutes part of the unpaid and delinquent tax 
liability, it should logically belong to the IRS and thus should not be 
refunded.  However, if OICs truly add value precisely by drawing in 
fresh sources of funds to pay off a tax liability, then it is not so clear 
that the partial down payment originates from the taxpayer and is only 
now being paid over to the IRS.  Rather, the down payment actually 
belongs to someone other than the taxpayer or the IRS, namely, the 
third-party funder of the partial payment.   
New funds introduced by a third-party financer in the OIC context 
are analogous to debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing in a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.  Chapter 11 DIP financing can provide a business with the 
funds that it needs to continue operations.296  Bankruptcy law does not 
conceive of the dollars contributed by the DIP lender as belonging to 
the other creditors of the debtor.  Instead, the DIP loan may be given 
priority status in the bankruptcy.297  It is well recognized in the bank-
ruptcy context that awarding such priority is necessary to generate the 
new money needed to keep the debtor afloat.298  This reasoning is 
equally applicable in the OIC situation.  The third-party backers of 
submitted offers should also be recognized as having first rights to the 
return of this money in the event that the IRS rejects a delinquent 
taxpayer’s offer.299  
 
296 See generally Marcia Goldstein, Bankruptcy 2010:  Views from the Bench, Debtor in Pos-
session Financing (“Adequate DIP financing is the lifeblood for most chapter 11 debt-
ors.”), in LEVERAGED FINANCING 2010, at 129, 131 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Series, 2010).  
297 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (2006) (authorizing the bankruptcy trustee to obtain post-
petition financing that is secured or that has super-priority status). 
298 See Goldstein, supra note 296, at 132 (noting that the “protections available to 
the postpetition lender increase[] depending on the availability of other forms of cred-
it” and that “it is extremely rare to see any postpetition lending which is not on a senior 
secured basis”). 
299 Although the IRS has not recognized the rights of third-party backers to these 
funds, California tax law has.  California has its own state-level OIC program.  The Cali-
fornia program recognizes that if an OIC deposit was “posted” by a third party, the 
third party must give consent before such deposit can be applied to the underlying tax 
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B.  One Reform That Probably Will Not Work 
Under the framework proposed in this Article, reforms likely to 
reduce counterproductive responses by players with divergent interests 
should be seriously considered.  Section IV.A presented two such re-
forms.  Conversely, reforms that will likely give rise to counterproduc-
tive responses should be viewed with suspicion.  In 2006, TIGTA 
suggested increasing collections on taxpayer accounts for which OICs 
were either rejected or returned.300  TIGTA reported that, while OIC 
determinations involve the investment of much time and resources, 
“when an offer evaluation results in a decision not to accept, the IRS 
generally returns the taxpayer’s delinquent account to the normal col-
lection process,” and that “[t]he systemic processes involved, in effect, 
suspend the IRS’s contact with the taxpayers while delinquent accounts 
await assignment to other collection functions.”301  TIGTA recommend-
ed that the Commissioner of the Small Business/Self-Employed Divi-
sion should review the effectiveness of collections efforts on taxpayer 
accounts for which OICs were not accepted and consider whether 
more could be done to collect on those accounts.302  In response, the 
IRS noted that it was “evaluating the use of a Hand-Off Unit at the 
Brookhaven campus,” which “initiates appropriate collection proce-
dures on rejected or withdrawn cases,” and would determine whether 
such a Unit should be permanent.303  Based on a December 2006 IRS 
study, the Hand-Off Unit was subsequently disbanded, though other 
methods of continuing collections activity on rejected or withdrawn 
offers continue to be pursued.304 
 
payment.  STATE OF CAL. BD. OF EQUALIZATION, OFFER IN COMPROMISE APPLICATION § 3 
(2006). 
300 TIGTA JULY 2006 FINAL AUDIT REPORT, supra note 53, at 22-26. 
301 Id. at 22. 
302 Id. at 26. 
303 Id.; see also 2006 GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 25-26 (describing the Hand-Off 
Unit procedures). 
304 See IRS Offers in Compromise:  Performance Has Been Mixed; Better Management Infor-
mation and Simplification Could Improve the Program, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-525 (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (“[I]n Decem-
ber 2006, the IRS completed a pilot study of the hand-off unit and determined that it 
could use other procedures to more efficiently expedite the handling of rejected and 
withdrawn offer cases to ACS and field processing.”); see also 2006 Annual Report to Con-
gress:  The Most Serious Problems Encountered by Taxpayers, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/2006_arc_report_card_0907_update.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2012) (noting, in the 
IRS’s response to the 2006 NTA Annual Report, that “[t]he results of the test indicate 
that the same outcome can be achieved by establishing procedures to have the account 
worked in [the Automated Collection System] or the field where more resources are 
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It is probably true that more aggressive efforts could be undertaken 
to generate collections from taxpayers whose offers are not accepted.  
Because the OIC process may generate contact with the delinquent 
taxpayer and knowledge of the taxpayer’s assets, such efforts may 
make some sense.  But such an initiative must be approached with cau-
tion.  If potential applicants perceive a substantial risk that any infor-
mation provided as part of a compromise offer may be used to pursue 
taxpayers more aggressively after an offer is rejected, then they will 
most likely be discouraged from submitting an offer altogether.  This 
is especially likely in the current environment, in which taxpayers and 
their representatives already perceive the IRS’s unwillingness to accept 
offers or to give submitted offers fair consideration.  Thus, any gains 
from more aggressive collection must be balanced against the declin-
ing offers and collections that may result. 
In sum, the proposal for more aggressive and efficient collections 
actions is exactly the kind of reform that could cause one stakeholder 
(the taxpayer-applicant) to react in ways that ultimately harm the ef-
fectiveness of the program, even though it was undertaken by another 
stakeholder (the IRS) with good intentions.  The potential adverse 
implications of this proposal—and any proposal that risks a similar  
dynamic—therefore need to be seriously analyzed before being adopted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Offer-in-Compromise procedure has the potential to be an ef-
fective and functional program for dealing with the problem of tax-
payers who cannot pay.  Revenue-based, fairness-based, rehabilitative, 
and socioeconomic considerations all support the existence of a mean-
ingful tax-debt forgiveness procedure.  Unfortunately, most commen-
tators agree that, as currently constituted, the procedure does not 
function very well.  The question then becomes how the program 
should be rehabilitated.  This Article has shown that the fundamental 
structure of the OIC procedure tends to trigger stakeholder dynamics 
that may lessen its effectiveness.  An important feature of the proce-
dure is the fact that the power over its implementation and effective-
ness is dispersed among four stakeholders with conflicting interests as 
to how the forgiveness of tax debts in general, and the OIC procedure 
 
available to address collectibility” and that “[t]he IRS is in the process of developing 
procedures to ensure these cases are immediately worked and the financial information 
is shared with [the Automated Collection System] and the field”).   
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in particular, should operate.  These stakeholders are Congress, the 
IRS, the taxpayer, and financial and other backers of the taxpayer.  
Historically, the actions and decisions of each of these players have 
had feedback effects on the behavior of other players, such that overall 
program effectiveness has been consistently undermined.  In sum, dis-
persion of power, divergence of interests, and behavioral feedback ef-
fects have worked together to ensure that the program perpetually 
self-corrects toward a weak or ineffective equilibrium.   
To counteract these effects, the OIC procedure should be re-
formed by either centralizing power among fewer stakeholders or 
eliminating features that provoke downward-spiraling interactions of 
divergent interests.  Since it is difficult to eliminate stakeholders, the 
latter strategy is more effective.  In particular, two concrete reforms 
could minimize the effects of divergent and competing stakeholder 
interests:  (1) restructuring the program such that an independent 
adjudicator or a decisionmaker with an independent status or man-
date evaluates and determines whether to accept submitted offers, and 
(2) making the user fee and required partial payments refundable.  
On the other hand, reforms that have the potential to deter taxpayers 
from submitting offers—such as the proposal to leverage information 
from failed compromise offers to support more aggressive collection 
efforts—should be carefully scrutinized.   
I certainly do not mean to suggest that my proposed solutions are 
the only ways in which the OIC procedure can and should be reformed.  
On the contrary, there are many avenues for improvement that I have 
not addressed here.  Nor do I imply that there are no other problems 
with the program besides those discussed under the stakeholder dynam-
ics framework presented in this Article.  Rather, my point is that a 
meaningful understanding and analysis of the structural features of the 
procedure’s administration—in particular, the presence of divergent 
interests among the key players—is necessary in order to ensure that 
any proposed changes are effective, rather than counterproductive.   
